

Gert Nylander

GERMAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT AND ENGLAND
Carl Goerdeler and the Wallenberg Brothers

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- No. 1 Ulf Olsson: *Stockholms Enskilda Bank and the Bosch Group, 1939-1950* (1998, 64 pages)
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The Foundation for Economic History Research within Banking and Enterprise was established in 1994 for the purpose of promoting research into economic history, esp. business history. With this end in view, the Foundation collects, organizes and manages the historical archives of Stockholms Enskilda Bank (1856-1971) and its Management, as well as those of other companies and foundations closely associated with that bank. In 1994-1995, these historical archives were transferred to refurbished premises close to the Villa "Täcka Udden" at Djurgården in Stockholm.

The archives have been made available for research within those areas supported by the Foundation. Since the 1950's these archives are among the most useful and well-used for different business history monographs. Sources from here form the basis of a long series of research.

In order to provide information about its archives, the Foundation has decided to issue a series of publications on the theme Bank and Enterprise. The series will be published mainly in English and present the results of research, which to an essential extent is based upon the archives of the Foundation.

A more detailed, up-to-date information about these matters can be obtained via the Internet. The web-service of the Foundation may be found under <http://arkiv.wallenberg.org>.

Marcus Wallenberg
Chairman

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Preface

A description of the history of Stockholms Enskilda Bank played a central part in the preparations for the 100th anniversary of the Bank in 1956. This meant that the archives of the Bank, which had not been used before, were made available to historical research. These archives would prove to contain a great deal of highly interesting and fruitful material.

A historical presentation was published in two parts in connection with the anniversary. After that, a number of monographs on the development of the Bank and several biographies on its leaders have been published on the basis of source material from the archives of the Bank. Several monographs on corporate customers have furthermore benefited from valuable information from these archives.

When word spread about the existence of the archives, many inquiries were received, which generally could be answered. In one particular area, however, the material was too fragile to provide sufficient information, viz. as regards the role that the Wallenberg brothers played as connecting links between the leaders of the German Resistance against Hitler and the British Government.

This situation was completely reversed in 1997 through the recovery of a number of documents in the Bank. Due to their special character, these documents had not been sorted among the series belonging to the Management archives, which was normal procedure, but placed in various envelopes with the instructions that only Jacob Wallenberg, or Marcus Wallenberg, was allowed to open them. There may be several explanations for the fact that these documents were kept separately from the beginning: They had no connection with the regular activities of the Bank, but existed due to the personal action of the top executives of the Bank; They touched upon sensitive issues regarding the relations with foreign powers. The war was still going on and it was important not to bring the documents to the knowledge of unauthorized persons and that they, in case of occupation, quickly could be taken care of and destroyed. It would have been more difficult to arrange for this, if they had been sorted among other documents.

The course of events reflected by the documents had been made possible thanks to Carl Goerdeler, a member of the German Resistance Movement, who had been given a new employment with the company Robert Bosch GmbH in Stuttgart after he broke with the Nazi regime in 1936. Robert Bosch, founder and owner of the company, was a prominent but distinctive personality among the German industrialists. He took a keen interest in social issues and gave important donations to welfare institutions and educational establishments. According to Ritter, he was one of the active opponents of the Hitler rule. He did not content himself with donating large sums of money to the victims of this regime, particularly prosecuted Jewish compatriots and students of divinity. He also gathered a circle of people of a like mind around himself, including Carl Goerdeler.

As a representative of the Bosch Group, Goerdeler got into contact with Stockholms Enskilda Bank and Jacob Wallenberg. Gradually, this business relation developed into a close personal contact that aimed at the establishment of a connection between the German Resistance Movement and the British Government. In addition to Carl Goerdeler and Jacob Wallenberg, the principal parts were played by Marcus Wallenberg and Charles Hambro and it is from these people that the published documents emanate. The purpose of this presentation is to put these people into their proper context, rather than to make an in-depth analysis. It furthermore focuses on the new documents only and has not been expanded to comprise other sources.

The study was recently published in German in the magazine *Nordeuropaforum* (1998:1) and in Swedish in the magazine *Scandia* (1998:2). The present presentation has been slightly revised and expanded.

The original texts are naturally the most important for an analysis. But to assist the reader, the Swedish and German texts have been translated into English.

My warm thanks to Björn Norrbom, who is responsible for the English translation.

Stockholm, February, 1999
Gert Nylander

Background

After Adolf Hitler was appointed Chancellor of the German Reich on 30 January, 1933 the Nazis quickly took control of the entire government apparatus. The National Socialist German Workers' Party, as the complete name read, became the only permitted political party in July 1933. These unparalleled successes could be gained without meeting with any real resistance. The political opposition was paralysed and never given an opportunity of preparing any countermeasures. Opponents and other dissidents were forced away with the help of a superior propaganda machine and through a wave of assaults, arrests and threats. The Nazis were thus able to infiltrate the whole society. In other words, there was a total lack of opportunities for organized resistance by political groups against the Nazis.

The brutal force of the Nazi regime, its oppression of people of different opinions and its special treatment and prosecution of the Jews provoked a hidden opposition, although it took a while before it assumed a more definite shape. It was never widely supported by the population at large. Hitler's expansive foreign policy programme, particularly after he had declared his intention of occupying Czechoslovakia in 1937, made it ever more obvious that his policy would lead to war with the Western Powers. Opposition against such a development was centred around Ludwig Beck, Head of General Staff. In September, 1938, advanced plans existed for an intervention in order to remove Hitler from power. Towards the end of the month, however, the Western Powers gave in to Hitler's demands, allowing Germany to occupy Sudetenland. This success for Hitler led to a serious backlash for the opposition. One problem on this occasion, just like on other later occasions, was that the sworn opponents were dependent upon events beyond their control in order to implement a coup. After the failure, the military opposition disintegrated. Only a core was left. Beck had resigned at an early stage, but remained a unifying figure for the opposition. He was regarded as the obvious choice to become German Head of State, in the event of a change of regime.

As from 1938, the underground civil resistance that had started to grow within Bourgeois conservative circles found a leader in Carl Goerdeler, who built a network of like-minded people among civil servants, academics, priests and leaders among the workers. In addition, he tried to organize co-operation between various sectors of opposition within the Church, among students and radical intellectuals. Resistance centred around the groups surrounding Beck and Goerdeler, for which the objective was to implement some kind of a coup d'état. One important feature of their plans was to establish contact with like-minded people in other countries, particularly in England and the U.S.A., in order to achieve a commitment regarding a separate peace agreement in the event of a coup. These attempts were made through

various channels via neutral countries. The Wallenberg brothers represented one of these channels for contacts with England.

Several plans for capturing or liquidating Hitler were prepared, but all failed. Hitler would suddenly change his programme, without any forewarning, as well as place of residence. He was always surrounded by bodyguards. Once Colonel Graf von Stauffenberg eventually implemented a coup on 20 July, 1944, it was a failure. The accounts were ruthlessly settled with the coup-makers: over a thousand people were arrested, two hundred were sentenced to death by the People's Court and liquidated.

Jacob Wallenberg's close co-operation with the German Resistance, particularly with Carl Goerdeler, during the Second World War became better known in 1947 through the book "Germany's Underground", written by the American author Allen Welsh Dulles. Another study that was published at the same time was Hans Rothfels' work "Die deutsche Opposition gegen Hitler. Eine Würdigung", which was published later in a revised and expanded version. In 1953, the German Resistance Movement was analysed in detail in Gerhard Ritter's study "Carl Goerdeler und die deutsche Widerstandsbewegung", still considered the standard work on the subject.¹ Several other works have also dealt with this issue. Joachim Fest has recently provided an instructive compilation of the course of events and persons involved in his book "Staatsstreich. Der lange Weg zum 20. juli", published in English with the title "Plotting Hitler's Death. The Story of the German Resistance". In 1997 Ines Reich published her doctoral thesis on Carl Goerdeler's activities from the period as Lord Mayor of Leipzig under the Nazi regime, up to his resignation of office. For a couple of years Erik Carlsson, a Swedish historian, has been working on a doctoral thesis on the subject of Sweden and the German Resistance Movement, which was published in 1998.²

Goerdeler's main contact with England during the war was via the Wallenberg brothers. Both Rothfels and Dulles have emphasized this point. Dulles was able to reproduce an account of Jacob Wallenberg's connections with Goerdeler, which account had been prepared by Jacob Wallenberg himself.³ At an early stage, Goerdeler had reported on the plans for a coup d'état in Germany, aimed at putting Hitler into jail or achieving his liquidation and at substituting the Nazi Government for a new one. The main reason for Goerdeler's having chosen to ask assistance from the Wallenberg brothers was to find out how Western Powers would react to a coup and to assess the prospect of a new German Government reaching a separate peace agreement with the Allies. These plans were very much in focus in the spring and autumn of 1943. However, the plotters had to report repeatedly that they had failed to put them into effect. In November, 1943, Jacob Wallenberg met with Goerdeler for the last time. This was also his last visit to Berlin during the war. He had been dissuaded from returning there, since his contacts with the German Resistance had become known. However, he continued to communicate with Goerdeler. In July 1944 he was asked to receive a person in Stockholm. The person in question was to bring news of the completion of the coup. On 20 July, 1944, the ill-fated attempt on

Hitler's life took place. The proposed messenger was put into jail and executed. Some time later, Goerdeler was to suffer the same fate.

In February 1951 Gerhard Ritter turned to Jacob Wallenberg for further information and clarifications, referring to the above-mentioned report that Dulles had published. When more than a year had passed without a reply having been received Ritter reverted to the subject. By this time his work on a biography on Carl Goerdeler was quite advanced. Jacob Wallenberg then sent him a memorandum by Goerdeler, dated in May 1943; and also promised to send him a translation of a letter from himself to Marcus Wallenberg from the same period concerning contacts with Churchill.⁴

Ritter thanked Jacob Wallenberg and expressed his great satisfaction over Goerdeler's memo, which fitted in well with what he had already learnt from papers left by Goerdeler. It furthermore served as a summary of the plans that Goerdeler had entertained at that time, which Ritter found important to have confirmed. Jacob's letter to Marcus Wallenberg was a long time coming. When October, 1953 arrived, Ritter still had not received the promised copy. On the other hand, he had met with Jacob Wallenberg and had had a long and detailed conversation with him in Stockholm in September, in which connection he had received complementary information as regards the above-mentioned report. Jacob Wallenberg had also granted permission that Goerdeler's memo from May 1943 could be published. A copy is provided below. Ritter makes a full report on this conversation, stressing that the relevant memo is unusually short, compared with other reports by Goerdeler.⁵ This could probably be explained by the fact that Goerdeler had prepared this document during the night, as requested by Jacob Wallenberg, in order to have it ready for a Swedish courier the following morning.

This proves that both Dulles and Ritter were able to use material for their reports that originated from the Wallenberg brothers, particularly from Jacob. This is how their connections with German and English circles during the war became known outside Sweden. In Sweden, on the other hand, this has not been observed to any significant extent. On more than one occasion, Ritter makes reference to oral information that he has received from Jacob Wallenberg.⁶ However, the documents to which he refers have not been found in the archives of Stockholms Enskilda Bank - where they ought to have been, since all documents were submitted to the files of the Secretariat of the Management as a matter of routine.

In the course of various conversations, Jacob Wallenberg was able to recall certain events from the war years and, above all, some of the individuals with whom he had had dealings. One person he mentioned in particular was Goerdeler. On one or two occasions, he made it clear to me that he had not kept any material concerning his contacts with the German Resistance Movement. This was due to the fact that he feared Sweden would be occupied and that such material would then end up in German hands. Or, as he put it: "Nobody should have to be hanged because of me", i.e. because of compromising material being found among his papers. It is in the nature of things that contacts of this sort do

not give rise to much written material and that it is better to trust one's memory. Jacob Wallenberg had an excellent memory. Still, it is astonishing how few documents about these extraordinary events that have been preserved in the generally comprehensive and well-arranged Management archives. Even more surprising and difficult to explain, however, is the fact that Dulles and Ritter were able to obtain copies of documents that undoubtedly existed in these archives as late as 1953.

In 1997, an investigation and inventory were made of the premises of Stockholms Enskilda Bank's Head office at Kungsträdgårdsgatan in Stockholm. This was done for a number of reasons: (i) A new organization for the preservation of the archives of Stockholms Enskilda Bank and the Wallenberg family had been created. (ii) The desire to have a complete grasp and detailed knowledge of their contents for the purpose of various research projects. (iii) Pending reorganizations and relocations. A number of documents that had been hidden since the war were then found in a vault belonging to the Management Secretariat. They were found in sealed envelopes, upon which it was written that they could only be opened by Jacob or Marcus Wallenberg. They had been opened and re-sealed on several occasions. The last time they were opened was in connection with Gerhard Ritter's visit to Jacob Wallenberg on 26 September, 1953.

In August, 1997 these documents were incorporated into the archives that had been set up for the preservation of documents belonging to Stockholms Enskilda Bank and the Wallenberg family in 1994. These archives are managed by the Foundation for Economic History Research within Banking and Enterprise.

The dating of the documents alone indicates that they are quite remarkable in nature. Basically, they are related to Goerdeler's efforts during the spring and autumn of 1943 to establish direct contact with Churchill, through his association with the Wallenberg brothers, in order to ascertain what kind of attitude England and the U.S.A. would adopt with respect to negotiations for a separate peace agreement with Germany after the opposition had managed to carry out its plans to depose Hitler and to form a new German Government. As shown above, this was essentially made known through the studies of Dulles, Rothfels and Ritter, although contemporary documents concerning the activities of the Wallenberg brothers in this connection have been lacking. Thanks to the newly discovered documents this can now be clarified.

In order to make the presentation as complete as possible, all other relevant documents in the Management archives of Stockholms Enskilda Bank regarding the Wallenberg brothers' participation in the course of events and their relations with the resistance in Germany have been included together with the above-mentioned documents. In addition, there is a report on the contacts maintained after the war with Goerdeler's widow Anneliese Goerdeler.

It is considered important to publish these documents and to make them available to research as soon as possible. The material is also of interest for the debate on Sweden's, not least the Wallenberg brothers', relations with Germany and Nazism during the war. It has been the ambition to contribute to presenting as complete a picture as possible of

a chain of events during World War II, which was dramatic and important from both a Swedish and international point of view. Time does not allow for a more detailed analysis at this stage.

For background purposes, the following brief presentation of the main characters is provided, viz. Jacob Wallenberg, Marcus Wallenberg and Carl Goerdeler as well as certain basic facts of history.

Jacob Wallenberg (1892-1980) attended the Naval College, in accordance with family tradition, and graduated as a Naval Officer in 1912. He left the Navy, however, and graduated from the Stockholm School of Economics in 1914. After a couple of years of banking practice in Basle, London and New York he started working for the family bank, Stockholms Enskilda Bank, where he was appointed Deputy Managing Director in 1920. Between 1927 and 1946 he was the Managing Director of the Bank.

From its start in 1856, Stockholms Enskilda Bank had been characterized by a strong focus on international business. During A.O. Wallenberg's period, 1856 to 1886, this business was channelled through German, British and, later on, also French banks. His sons and successors, K.A. Wallenberg and Marcus Wallenberg Senior, had continued this international orientation.

During the inter-war period, business relations with Germany were strongly reinforced, largely owing to Marcus Wallenberg Senior's active participation in the European reconstruction work. This led to the Bank participating in a large number of bond loans to German federal states, towns and companies. Marcus Wallenberg Sr. played a particularly active and central role during the German banking crisis in 1931, when he acted as an adviser to the German Government in the reconstruction of German banks. He also acted as Chairman in the so-called Stillhalte Court. Jacob Wallenberg managed the Bank's German business relations together with his father, which led to a lively and comprehensive correspondence with the leaders of the large German banks.

After the Nazis came to power, the conditions of Germany's foreign trade were radically changed. In the summer of 1934, the Swedish Government therefore appointed a Commission for the purpose of negotiating a trade and payment agreement with Germany. This Commission consisted originally of three persons: Arvid Richert, Under-Secretary of State and later Swedish Envoy in Berlin, Björn Prytz, Managing Director of the Swedish ball-bearing company SKF and Jacob Wallenberg. Later, the Commission was expanded to a considerable extent, and finally totalled some 50 people. Jacob Wallenberg took part in these negotiations up to 1944. He has been described as Sweden's main negotiator for the exchange of goods with Germany. This was absolutely vital to the Swedish economy during the war. In particular, his name is associated with the construction of a so-called price scale, according to which a price balance was created between a certain quantity of Swedish iron ore, on the one hand, and certain quantities of German coal and coke, commercial iron and chemical products, on the other hand.⁷ The extensive network of

contacts within the German world of banking and industry that Jacob Wallenberg had built up, partly taken over from his father, was gradually extended to those civil and military circles which formed the opposition against the Nazi regime. The most important figure among these persons was Carl Goerdeler. Through him and others, Jacob Wallenberg was afforded a unique opportunity of obtaining information about internal conditions prevailing in Germany during the war.

Apart from his official mission as negotiator on behalf of the Swedish Government, Jacob Wallenberg was able to establish close contact with the German Resistance Movement and to serve, together with his brother Marcus, as a connecting link between this movement and the Western Powers.

Marcus Wallenberg (1899-1982) passed his examination to become an officer in the reserve in 1919 and graduated from the Stockholm School of Economics in 1920. After banking studies in Geneva, London, New York, Paris and Berlin he started working at Stockholms Enskilda Bank. In 1927, he was appointed Deputy Managing Director and in 1946 he replaced his brother as Head of the Bank.

In September 1939 the Swedish Government appointed a large and well-balanced delegation of representatives for negotiations with the British Government concerning trade and shipping issues. Erik Boheman, under-secretary of state for foreign affairs, was appointed Chairman and Marcus Wallenberg participated as a member of the Delegation. It was probably particularly gratifying for Marcus Wallenberg to accept this assignment since his father had acted in a similar capacity during World War I.

The trade negotiations with Germany and Britain were conducted simultaneously during the autumn and agreements were signed in London on 7 December and in Berlin on 22 December, 1939.⁸ Due to the aggravation of the crisis between Finland and Russia, Erik Boheman had been recalled to Sweden at the end of October and Marcus Wallenberg had taken over his post as Chairman of the Swedish Delegation. After his return home Richard Sandler, Minister for Foreign Affairs, thanked him by expressing "the Swedish Government's great appreciation of the excellent way in which you both participated and led, the negotiations in London, taking good care of Sweden's interests". Marcus Wallenberg was also appointed Chairman of the Swedish representatives on the permanent Swedish-British Government Commission, which had been set up to deal with issues associated with the implementation of the trade agreement.⁹ During the negotiations, Marcus Wallenberg's excellent business relations in London were of great use. They were particularly good with Charles Hambro, whom he got to know in the early 1920s. From then on up to 1939, there exists a comprehensive correspondence between them. Naturally, this close personal contact facilitated work when they became opposite parties in the trade negotiations, like their fathers, Eric Hambro and Marcus Wallenberg Sr., had been during World War I.

Carl Goerdeler (1884-1945) after a successful career in the civil service became Lord Mayor of Leipzig in 1930. With roots in old monarchical Germany he was nationalistic and bourgeois conservative by nature. His organizational talent within administration and finance was noticed on a national level and, in 1931, he was appointed National Inspector of Price Control. After the Nazi take-over he tried to co-operate with the new regime for a couple of years. In 1934 he was again given the assignment to supervise the price control. When his term as Lord Mayor ended in 1936, he was re-elected for a period of twelve years. However, clashes of opinion arose at local level and reached an acute stage in November, 1936. In Goerdeler's absence, the Nazi representatives in the City Administration forced through a decision to remove a monument to the Jewish composer Felix Mendelssohn, a decision that Goerdeler had opposed. After his return to Leipzig he demanded that the monument be restored, to which the party representatives objected. Goerdeler then handed in his resignation and left office effective 1 April, 1937.¹⁰ His upright position made him well known all over the country and gave him a great deal of personal prestige. As a result of this decision, Goerdeler retired from public service and had to look for other assignments. He had earlier been offered membership of the Executive Management of the Krupp Group, although Hitler would not approve this after the break. Instead, he was offered a rather independent position as adviser to the electronic company Robert Bosch GmbH in Stuttgart. Robert Bosch, founder and owner of the company, belonged to the opponents to the Hitler regime and had gathered around him a circle of like-minded people. From the summer of 1937 until the summer of 1939, Goerdeler made a number of foreign travel on the company's behalf. Goerdeler ran into difficulties when his passport was confiscated, but after a call in person on Hermann Göring that problem was solved. He travelled to Belgium, Holland, England, France, Switzerland, Canada, the U.S.A., the Balkan countries, Africa and the Middle East. He established connections with politicians, business leaders and economists in all these countries.¹¹ Goerdeler trusted his own ability to persuade his opposite party through his ways of arguing in personal meetings. He endeavoured to spread knowledge about the existence of a Germany that was different from that of the Nazis, in the hope that reason would prevail and that a World War could be stopped as a result of talks between various people.

Through his background and personality, Goerdeler became the driving force within civil opposition. The Resistance Movement regarded him as a suitable Chancellor of the Reich after Hitler, provided a coup could be carried into effect against the latter. During the war he tried to establish contacts with the British Government in order to avoid an unconditional capitulation after a coup d'état and to procure favourable peace conditions for a new German Government. Jacob Wallenberg and his brother Marcus represented one of his channels in this connection, as appears from the documents provided below. After the attempt on Hitler's life failed on 20 July, 1944, Goerdeler tried to keep out of the way, but was arrested after a couple of weeks, put before

the People's Court and sentenced to death in September. Up to the day of his execution, on 2 February, 1945, he kept himself busy in prison unceasingly writing on various subjects.¹² On Christmas Eve 1944 he wrote a letter in his prison cell, addressed to the Swedish Envoy in Berlin. This letter, which has been reproduced herein, was to be forwarded to Jacob Wallenberg.

Goerdeler's first contact with the Wallenberg family and Stockholms Enskilda Bank took place on 12 November, 1936 when he, equipped with a letter of introduction from Hjalmar Schacht, Governor of the Reichsbank, was received by Marcus Wallenberg Sr. He was on his way home from a lecture in Helsinki, when the news about the removal of the monument to Mendelssohn reached him in Stockholm. The next time Goerdeler paid a visit to the Bank was on 1 September, 1939, i.e. on the day of the outbreak of the Second World War. The purpose of his visit was to find a Swedish buyer for certain subsidiaries of the Bosch Group in neutral countries. Jacob Wallenberg showed interest and further discussions on the subject were held between him and the Jewish banker Waldemar von Oppenheim. In autumn 1939 rather complicated agreements were being drawn up. Hans Walz, who was close to Robert Bosch, together with K.E. Thomä, Head of the Legal Department, represented the company. The Bank was represented by Rolf Calissendorff and legal counsel.¹³ Calissendorff was of Jewish origin. He had been employed by the Bank in 1919, worked at the Secretariat of the Management and was later appointed Manager and head of the international section. He had become one of Jacob Wallenberg's closest associates.

In order to prevent Germany's enemies from seizing its foreign subsidiaries, as had been the case during World War I, the Bosch Group wished to place them in the hands of neutral owners. Jacob Wallenberg's interest in the proposed transaction was related to the opportunities that it offered to exchange doubtful German bonds in the portfolio of the Bank against shares in Bosch companies. According to the agreements entered into, the SEB Group purchased eight European subsidiaries in neutral countries as well as the American Bosch Corporation in the U.S.A. In a formal sense, the buyers were subsidiaries of the holding-company Providentia, but the transactions were financed by the Bank. Unsigned additions had been attached to the agreements, according to which the parent company in Stuttgart had the right to repurchase its subsidiaries after the war. As things developed, this sort of arrangement became embarrassing to the Bank. After protracted negotiations and frequent contacts between the Bank and Bosch, the Bank managed to get out of its ownership as regards the European companies in 1942 and 1943.

However, its engagement in the American company lasted much longer and was much harder to master. When the United States of America entered the war in December, 1941 there was an imminent risk that the shares of American Bosch Corporation would be seized by the American authorities, both because of the close relations between the American subsidiary and its German parent company before the war and because of its importance to the U.S. armaments industry.

The Bank now declared to Bosch that it neither could, nor wished to, be bound by any option agreements, due to the new situation. Bosch found itself compelled to agree to cancel the repurchasing rights to the shares and it was also agreed that all additions to the agreements regarding these rights be destroyed. The Bank acted accordingly. To the U.S. authorities the Bank maintained that the purchase of the American Bosch Corporation was a real purchase and a long-term investment. However, the U.S. Government considered the ownership relations unclear and seized the company as enemy property in May, 1942. After the war, American troops found preserved copies of the cancelled provisions regarding repurchasing rights in the archives of Bosch in Stuttgart. This reinforced American suspicions that a dummy relationship had existed during the war.¹⁴ It was this that would then develop into the so-called Bosch deal. It aroused great attention after the war and put the Bank and its Management in an extremely embarrassing situation. In early August, 1945 the U.S. Treasury declared Stockholms Enskilda Bank and the Wallenberg brothers "special blocked nationals". A permit was required in each individual case in order to have access to assets in the U.S.A. and the Bank was unable to do business in the U.S. on behalf of its customers. The Bosch deal led to an enormous loss of prestige for the Bank both within and outside Sweden and in its relations to both Swedish and U.S. authorities.

In 1947, the blockade was raised, after which the Bosch deal turned into a dispute between Stockholms Enskilda Bank and the American State concerning title to the shares of American Bosch. After years of preparations for a pending trial, a settlement was reached in 1950 to the effect that the Bank got back its original investment, albeit without recompense for any increase in value.¹⁵ An indirect consequence of the Bosch deal was that Jacob Wallenberg retired from the post of Managing Director a year or so earlier than expected. At the Annual General Meeting in March, 1946 his brother Marcus succeeded him as Head of the Bank.

The Bosch deal has a very special significance as regards this paper, because it served as a pretext for Carl Goerdeler to meet with Jacob Wallenberg without hindrance and also more frequently than otherwise would have been possible. It also afforded Goerdeler the opportunity of meeting with, and presenting his plans to, Marcus Wallenberg in Stockholm.¹⁶

In later conversations, Jacob Wallenberg expressed his astonishment at the fact that Goerdeler could move about so freely in Berlin, apparently without being followed. They nevertheless observed great caution in general, when meeting with each other, seeking places where they felt they could be safe and not overheard. Indoors, they preferred to sit in the centre of a room.

As official representative of Bosch, Goerdeler was able to travel abroad, which he otherwise would not have been allowed to do. Both for his own account and that of the German Resistance Movement he was able to use the Bosch deal as a pretext for maintaining contacts with neutral businessmen; these served as a connecting link with the Western

Powers for a planned separate peace agreement and for a common European mustering of strength against the Communist threat.

In order to give an idea of how, and to what extent, these personal contacts were maintained during the war, the following list is provided of the Wallenberg brothers' trips abroad as well as of visits paid, by various people, to Stockholms Enskilda Bank in connection with the subject matter of this paper.

Foreign travel during the war:

Jacob Wallenberg

10-23 December, 1939	Berlin
13-18 January, 1940	Berlin
27 May - 6 June, 1940	Berlin
23-26 August, 1940	Berlin
12-14 September, 1940	Berlin
17-19 October, 1940	Berlin
20-22 January, 1941	Copenhagen
23 January - 1 February, 1941	Berlin
22-26 April, 1941	Berlin
2-5 May, 1941	Berlin
3-15 November, 1941	Berlin
23 February - 5 March, 1942	Berlin
12-15 March, 1942	Berlin
4-9 June, 1942	Berlin
16-26 November, 1942	Berlin
17-20 February, 1943	Berlin
31 May - 3 June, 1943	Lökken Verk
11-12 August, 1943	Berlin
30 November - 3 December, 1943	Berlin

Marcus Wallenberg

24 September - 9 December, 1939	London
10 January - 3 February, 1940	London, Paris
22 February - 16 March, 1940	Paris
6-18 April, 1940	Paris, London
8-9 August, 1940	Helsinki
11 October, 1940 - 5 February 1941	Berlin-Lisbon-New York-Lisbon-Stuttgart
1-2 March, 1941	Helsinki
28 April - 3 May, 1941	Zurich
14-15 July, 1941	Berlin
8-10 September, 1941	Berlin
15-18 October, 1941	Helsinki
22 October - 22 December, 1941	London
16-17 January, 1942	Helsinki
7 May - 22 June, 1943	London
5-7 February, 1944	Helsinki

Rolf Calissendorff

23-25 October, 1939	Helsinki
13-21 December, 1939	Bucharest
15 July - 10 August, 1939	Moscow
10-17 September, 1939	Moscow
14-20 June, 1941	Budapest
2-25 February, 1943	Berlin, Paris
10-13 November, 1943	Paris, Madrid

Visits to Stockholms Enskilda Bank:

<i>Otto Fischer</i>	22 December, 1939 10-12 January, 1940
<i>Carl Goerdeler</i>	1 September, 1939 2 November, 1939 1-2 December, 1939 13-18 April, 1942 19-21 May, 1943
<i>Alfred Knoerzer</i>	14-16 May, 1939 19-22 July, 1940 17-18 June, 1943 8-9 September, 1943
<i>Waldemar von Oppenheim</i>	13-15 November, 1939 22-25 January, 1940 21 -25 October, 1941 11-17 February, 1942 9-11 April, 1942 21-23 October, 1942 19-21 August, 1943 8-13 March, 1944
<i>Erich Rassbach</i>	2-4 November, 1939 4-5 April, 1940 25-26 September, 1940 11-12 June, 1941 27 March, 1942
<i>K.E. Thomä</i>	1-5 December, 1939 9-13 January, 1940 4-5 April, 1940 14-16 May, 1940 19-22 July, 1940 25-26 September, 1940 9-10 January, 1941 11-13 June, 1941 12-17 December, 1941 18-20 April, 1942

27 May - 2 June, 1942
25-26 June, 1942
3-5 August, 1942
5-8 December, 1942
18-21 May, 1943
16-18 June, 1943
8-10 September, 1943
25-27 January, 1944
21-24 April, 1944
8-10 June, 1944
27 October - 2 November, 1944
1-7 December, 1944

Hans Walz

1-5 December, 1939
1-7 December, 1944

The Documents

Only a few of Goerdeler's letters have been preserved in Jacob Wallenberg's correspondence and just two originals. Both reached him while visiting Berlin; one as a cable of 23 February, 1942, the other as a letter dated 18 February, 1943. The new documents are presented below in chronological order:

20 May, 1943	Carl Goerdeler's plan of implementation.
21 May	Letter from Jacob Wallenberg to Marcus Wallenberg in various versions (drafts) and a letter dated 8 June from Jacob Wallenberg to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and a memorandum dated 7 June.
June	Marcus Wallenberg's notes from a meeting with Desmond Morton in London.
12 July	Jacob Wallenberg's notes from a telephone conversation.
12 August	Jacob Wallenberg's notes from a meeting with Carl Goerdeler in Berlin.
13 August	Letter from Marcus Wallenberg to Desmond Morton (draft).
25 August	Letter from Victor Mallet to Marcus Wallenberg.
6 September	Letter from Marcus Wallenberg to Desmond Morton (draft).
25 September	Letter from Victor Mallet to Marcus Wallenberg.
29 September	Letter from Charles Hambro to Marcus Wallenberg.
19 October	Letter from Charles Hambro to Marcus Wallenberg.
9 November	Message from Jacob Wallenberg to Rolf Calissendorff.
8 November, 1944	Letter from Carl Goerdeler to Jacob Wallenberg.

24 December Letter from Carl Goerdeler to the Swedish Envoy in Berlin.

In his important work “German Resistance against Hitler”, Klemens von Klemperer presents a broad survey of those different groups which together formed the internal opposition against Hitler and the Nazi regime. In addition to the abundant literature, this presentation is based upon extremely comprehensive source material, mainly from British, German and American archives. Carl Goerdeler’s activities are described in detail. Regarding Goerdeler’s contacts with the Wallenberg brothers in Sweden – the subject of the present study – Klemperer writes: “The main sources for the encounters between Goerdeler and the Wallenbergs are ‘Summary of Interview with M. Jacob Wallenberg’: ‘Unterredung mit Herrn Jacob Wallenberg, Samstag 26. Sept. 1953 in Stockholm, 14 Uhr 15-16 Uhr’. BA/K Ritter 131; also a summary put together by Jacob Wallenberg for Allen W. Dulles, in Dulles, *Germany’s Underground*, 142-6.”¹⁷ The last-mentioned memorandum dated 23 April, 1946 is reproduced below. More than anything, this statement by von Klemperer shows the importance of the new contemporary documents.

Between 19 and 21 May, 1943 Goerdeler was in Stockholm. This visit marked the beginning of concrete efforts at establishing contacts between the German opposition and the British Government, with the active participation of the Wallenberg brothers. During intensive conversations, Goerdeler described his own plans and hopes as well as those of the opposition. He also wrote a report on how the implementation of these plans, to which Ritter has made reference and commented upon. On the other hand, Jacob Wallenberg’s letter to his brother Marcus who was in London at the time, regarding his (Jacob’s) conversations with Goerdeler, has not previously been used in research.

Goerdeler wanted Marcus to report the contents of this letter to Churchill, or to Churchill’s personal secretary. The German generals refused to act without having certain preliminary commitments. Such commitments referred to the stopping of all bomb attacks during the liberation action and to the declaration regarding unconditional surrender that had been issued at the Casablanca conference in January, 1943. No military was prepared to assume responsibility for overthrowing Hitler and then for surrendering immediately afterwards. The letter was sent to London via the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which also dispatched cables containing questions from Marcus Wallenberg to Jacob Wallenberg regarding certain wording.

Marcus Wallenberg referred to the contents of the letter on 4 June at a meeting with Winston Churchill’s personal secretary Desmond Morton, whom he knew. Before his return to Sweden on 19 June he wrote a memorandum of this conversation, a document that has remained unknown to this day. Morton had reported that the war objectives had been fixed. Nazi Germany had to be crushed. Churchill’s aim was to eradicate Nazi gangster rule, which had led the world into this war. It was unthinkable that any advance blessing or approval of any kind of anti-Nazi elements could be granted from responsible allied

quarters. When Marcus Wallenberg asked whether a peace settlement without "unconditional surrender" were impossible, Morton categorically replied no. Churchill was unwilling to prolong the war for its own sake. The main objective was to obliterate Nazism and to create guarantees for the preservation of peace in the future. Morton had also said that the bombing of places in revolt would only be ceased if credible information about such a revolution could be provided.

On 12 August, Jacob Wallenberg met with Goerdeler in Berlin. He reported on the reaction in London and made notes of Goerdeler's views on the position. By now, the situation had developed to the point that generals in both east and west were prepared to break off relations with Nazism. After the implementation of a coup, Beck was to become the Supreme Commander and Regent and a new government should be formed on the basis of broad popular support. The representatives of the Nazi regime were to be called to account before a court. It was hoped that both Berlin as well as Leipzig and Stuttgart would be spared from bombings in order not to render a change of regime more difficult. An attempted coup was planned to be implemented before 15 September.

Immediately after his brother's return to Sweden, Marcus contacted Desmond Morton, saying that he had fresh and urgent news for Morton if he was interested. Morton thanked him for the letter via the British Minister in Stockholm. This encouraged Marcus Wallenberg to write a letter on 6 September, in which he gave an account of what his brother had learned from Goerdeler in more detail. The draft of this letter has been preserved.

Marcus Wallenberg received a reply to his letter from unexpected quarters and in an unusual form. It was addressed to him in a private letter from Charles Hambro, dated 29 September. In order to understand the relationship between Hambro and Marcus Wallenberg one must know that both knew each other since the early 1920s and that both, each in his own right, were principal characters in the trade negotiations between England and Sweden. It should also be mentioned that Hambro had remarried Marcus Wallenberg's first wife, Dorothy (Doie) Mackay and that their daughter Ann-Mari (Anis) was living with her mother and stepfather in London. Hambro's son from an earlier marriage was in Sweden during the war, where he attended a private school at Sigtuna together with Marcus Wallenberg's sons. He is referred to as "Poiken" ("the boy").

Hambro's letter consists of five pages, of which the first and the last are of a private nature, with flowing text. In-between, there were three loose pages of the same paper as the letter itself, but with a completely different text. In this section, reference is made to Marcus Wallenberg's earlier conversations and letters in an indirect manner, which is very hard to understand for an outsider. Hambro wrote that the relevant person should continue his plans, although no promises of any kind could be made. He then underlines that no one was to know that Marcus Wallenberg and himself were in contact on this particular subject, especially not the British legation. All messages were to be forwarded to him alone and in the same way as Marcus Wallenberg had received this particular letter. The messenger was not aware of anything and that was

to remain so. He was simply to receive and to pass on letters. The section concluded with an admonishment that it would probably be wise to destroy the pages in question. Special attention was to be paid to Hambro's letter in view of the high position that Hambro held at the time within SOE, Special Operations Executive. Hambro reverted to the subject in a letter dated 19 October, stressing that his earlier information had been approved by more prominent persons than himself and that it was not just a product of his own imagination. He concluded this letter by expressing the hope that he could find a pretext to come and see Marcus Wallenberg.

These letters from Charles Hambro, which have remained hidden since World War II, are extremely interesting in that they provide important information about a course of events which it has not been possible to clarify up to now. It appears that, via Jacob and Marcus Wallenberg, a channel had been opened between Carl Goerdeler and Charles Hambro - and thus the British Government. However, this channel was never used. In spite of Goerdeler's unwavering optimism about realising his plans, obstacles to their implementation constantly emerged. Instead, the developments led to the attempted assassination and the catastrophe on 20 July, 1944.

There are two letters from Goerdeler to Jacob Wallenberg, which Goerdeler wrote from prison. One is dated 8 November, 1944 and typewritten. It has been sorted into Jacob Wallenberg's correspondence, but it is not clear when it reached him. The other letter is dated 24 December, 1944. It is handwritten in pencil and addressed to "Euer Excellenz", the Swedish envoy in Berlin, requesting that it be forwarded to Jacob Wallenberg. According to Jacob Wallenberg's notes from November, 1946 the letter had, at that time, not reached him. It was most likely handed to him by Carl Goerdeler's widow, Anneliese Goerdeler, in connection with her visit to Stockholm in 1948.

Goerdeler asked Jacob Wallenberg to try and get Goerdeler's imprisoned family transferred to Sweden. He still had hopes of peace with the Western powers, although he realized that no revolt from the inside could be counted upon after the attempted assassination. The peace initiative would have to come from the outside. He proposed that the King of Sweden should put himself at the head of such an initiative, which implied that England and the U.S.A. entered into negotiations with the Nazi regime. As for himself, he hoped to play a part in such a development.

How Goerdeler managed to write letters in his prison cell, and have them smuggled out of the prison with the help of one of the prison guards, has been investigated by Ritter (page 434). Certain wordings indicate that Goerdeler was aware of the risk that his letters could fall into the wrong hands. Both letters are highly personal and touching documents from a man who, in a desperate situation, cherishes the hope for some kind of solution for his own part and is optimistic about his vision of a unified Western Europe.

Epilogue

In November, 1946 Jacob Wallenberg received a letter from the American zone in Germany, dated 25 October and written by Carl Goerdeler's widow, Anneliese Goerdeler. She starts by saying that she already wrote twice, sending one original and one copy of a letter that her husband had written from prison in the worst distress possible. She wishes to find out whether or not her husband's words had reached the addressee. (The letter referred to is obviously identical with the one of 24 December, 1944, reproduced below.)

On 29 November, Jacob Wallenberg sends his thanks to Mrs Goerdeler for her kind letter and advises her that he unfortunately did not receive any of the letters referred to above. He therefore asks her for a new copy of Goerdeler's letter. He furthermore seizes the opportunity to deplore Goerdeler's tragic fate, presenting his deep condolences to Mrs Goerdeler. He continued /in German/: "As you may be aware, since the autumn of 1939 I often met with Dr. Goerdeler and I regard him as a great patriot and a man of insight who clearly saw which horrendous misfortune that these crooks, i.e. Hitler and his gang, had brought to their fatherland and to millions of innocent people. Dr. Goerdeler understood that something had to be done and he was prepared to work for it and to risk his life in order to bring about a change. It is not only in the interests of Germany, but of all Europe, to feel very sorry about the fact that unfortunate circumstances put an end to his endeavours, when he finally was so close to being successful."

Together with his reply, Jacob Wallenberg sent a gift package, something that he seems to have done on several occasions. In August, 1947 Mrs Goerdeler writes to thank him for three packages, which will help her children, grandchildren and herself to survive during the forthcoming winter, which threatened to be unusually harsh after that year's prolonged drought.

Mrs Goerdeler also approached him with a very special request. Physically as well as mentally she was in strong need of real relaxation to recover strength. She had tried to go to Switzerland, but the U.S. authorities had refused to grant her permission to leave. She had now received an invitation to go to Sweden and asked whether she could refer to Jacob Wallenberg, when applying for an exit/entry permit. Jacob Wallenberg contacted the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The formalities took time, but in early November he was able to inform Mrs Goerdeler that a residence permit had been granted for eight weeks. He expressed delight at getting to see Mrs Goerdeler in person and hoped to get an opportunity to talk about questions of mutual interest.

It seems that this information arrived too late to allow Mrs Goerdeler to travel that year. Instead, she came the following autumn and stayed for three weeks. She did meet with Jacob Wallenberg, but when leaving on 21 October she wrote and regretted that she had not had the opportunity of speaking with him once more. In particular she wanted to find out whether or not the British authorities would agree to deliver to her the documents that her husband had been forced to write in prison on Hitler's orders. She also expressed her concern about Germany's awful situation and her worries about the future of her children and grandchildren.

Gradually, contacts between the Goerdeler family and Jacob Wallenberg ebbed out. He received word about Anneliese Goerdeler's decease, in August 1961, after a long suffering. Her son, Reinhard Goerdeler, a lawyer like his father, visited Stockholm at the end of 1966 and met Jacob Wallenberg. When he thanked for the conversation he invited Jacob Wallenberg, on his own and his brothers' and sisters' behalf, to come and visit them in Germany. Jacob Wallenberg thanked him wholeheartedly, but it does not seem that he made any trip.

This marks the end of an important and eventful part of Jacob Wallenberg's life, or, as Anneliese Goerdeler wrote /in German/: "I can imagine that, to you, all this means that you have coped with and finished one chapter of your active life."

Jacob Wallenberg's memorandum concerning certain conversations with Dr. Goerdeler of 23 April, 1946.

Dr. Gördeler paid a visit to my father and myself immediately after the outbreak of the war. He gave a very frank account of his extremely critical attitude towards Nazism and declared that he was most pessimistic about developments in Germany. My father had been commissioned by the Allies to work for a political relaxation of tension and economic co-operation in Europe during the 1920s and early 1930s, in which connection he had become rather familiar with the German problems. He was on good terms with Brüning and also tried to get in contact with Hitler, who did not receive him. In connection with the Kreuger crash, I succeeded Rydbeck on those committees which were assigned the task of protecting Swedish claims on Germany. Thus, I subsequently also became a member of the Swedish Government commission for our economic relations with Germany, which gave me occasion to follow developments in Germany more closely. Both my father's and my own views corresponded closely to those of Dr. Gördeler.

I often met with G. during the war and had conversations with him that lasted for hours about the situation in Germany, the military situation, descriptions of leading Nazis, leading members of the armed forces and, finally, about G.'s plans for overthrowing the Nazi regime. These conversations were so numerous, so long and so comprehensive and the information that I received so sensational and important that I cannot enter into all this in a brief memorandum.

Quite early, probably in 1940, we discussed the possibilities of a coup d'état in Germany. I often stressed the fact that people outside Germany were astonished about the non-existence of an organized movement in Germany, in particular as people knew that large segments of the German people and many of its most prominent leaders were extremely hostile towards Nazism. G. replied that this accusation was partly unjustified, since probably close to 200,000 Germans had been imprisoned or sent to concentration camps because of their opposition against the regime. Without assistance from the military, no coup d'état was possible and it was hard to secure military help as long as the military successes lasted. G. was working closely with leading military representatives, in particular with General Beck, and with the union movement. In addition, several high-ranking former public officials belonged to the circle of people that discussed these problems.

In November, 1941, G. advised me about the catastrophe outside Moscow. During a visit in February, 1942 he described the enormous extent of this catastrophe and said that Hitler had dismissed and court-martialled a number of officers, although everyone knew that Hitler himself was responsible for the defeat. Most of them were found not guilty by the court martial, but a sense of bitterness prevailed among the higher officers after that. G. was now more hopeful about his possibilities.

In April, 1942, G. came to Stockholm. The purpose of his visit was to make us contact Churchill. G. said that he had been in personal contact with Churchill before the outbreak of war. He wished to get a preliminary peace commitment from the Allies, in case they should succeed to capture Hitler and overthrow the Nazi regime. This was not the first time that G. got on to this topic. I always tried to make it clear that no preliminary commitments could be made. In order to persuade him even more, I arranged a meeting between him and my brother, who had intimate contacts with the British. He, too, declared categorically to G. that no preliminary commitments could be made. During my visits to Berlin on later occasions, he reverted to the subject and we had several long deliberations in November, 1942.

I tried to convince him about the risk to which he exposed himself and his collaborators, since a matter of this calibre most certainly would be handled by so many people in England or America that there was a risk for leakage. This did not frighten him. Then I tried to make him aware that he, as a good German patriot, should not let himself be guided by the attitude of his present enemies. As he considered that a change of regime was the right thing from a German point of view in order to save Germany, he and his friends should try and carry out such a change, regardless of the views that people in London or Washington might take.

It seems to me that this last argument was more effective. He said that he would discuss this with his friends and revert, which he also did after a couple of days, stating that they were convinced that it was correct to act without any promises from the Allies. But he asked me to be available for getting into contact with the Allies. I promised this, as soon as the present regime had been overthrown.

I also met with G. in February 1943. He then declared, on the one hand, that the demand for unconditional surrender formulated at the Casablanca meeting made his work with the German armed forces more difficult, since many officers considered that if the German forces were to surrender, this should rather be left to Hitler himself. On the other hand, the catastrophe at Stalingrad had taken place. G. advised me that a coup was planned for March. He was not certain whether or not it would be possible to stage it, since Hitler nowadays was extremely cautious. He surrounded himself with a bodyguard consisting of 3,000 people and hardly dared to show up at the front any more. In May, G. came to Stockholm. He knew that my brother was in London and asked that my brother should immediately try and get into contact with Churchill. I asked him to prepare a memorandum, listing all those points which the new regime possibly was willing to accept, such as punishment of war criminals, war indemnity, disarmament, democratic regime, etc. etc. G. handed me a detailed memo. He came back to a few points, which he had already brought up earlier, viz. that as soon as a coup had been staged in Germany, the Allies should stop all further bombings of German civilian targets, thus making their friendly attitude towards the new regime known to the German people. He further wished that Berlin and Leipzig should be spared as far as possible during the next few days, since the central organization of the Resistance Movement was located

there. A break-up of the connections would make a coup much more difficult. I contacted my brother, who also took up certain contacts.

In August, I received word from G. that I should come to Berlin on an important issue. I then gave myself reason to go there and had several meetings with him. The main point was that all preparations had now been made for a coup in September and that the intention was now to send a certain Mr Schlabrendorff to Stockholm as soon as possible. He asked me to contact the British in order to have them send a suitable person to Stockholm to meet with S. I answered that I would be pleased to do so, as soon as the coup had taken place, and that I would inform the Allies that a German had arrived here as representative of the new men and that the latter wished to contact the Allies, not for the purpose of negotiating but for their advice to the new government how it should act in order to achieve an armistice and peace. I accepted the commission on these terms.

On this occasion, like every time we met for the last year, G. would discuss various people. He was particularly anxious to learn about the situation of Schacht. I believe that Schacht wished to play a leading part and that he considered himself a suitable foreign minister. I dissuaded G. and said that the Allies did not consider Schacht suitable and that, with the exception of Bank of England, people were critical of him. G. then informed me that the Social Democrats in Germany also were opposed to bringing Schacht into the new government, but that they intended to make him Governor of the Central Bank again. This was something that I supported. G. had told me as early as in May that it was intended to make General Beck regent, if the coup was successful, and to form an interim government with representatives of the military, public officials and the unions. He never stated which position he himself would get in the new government. Elections were to be held as soon as possible and G. considered it likely that the Social Democrats would dominate them. On this, as on previous occasions, we discussed the relations with Himmler, who had made advances on several occasions. Himmler was not trusted, however, and the intention was to seize him at the same time as Hitler.

I eagerly waited for September and did not find an opportunity to get in contact with G. until the end of November/early December, when I was back in Berlin again. G. explained that on two different occasions, would-be assassins had lost their lives on their way to the place of attack. He said that the plans had not been abandoned in any way, but that the work was forcefully continued. From the beginning the idea was to seize and court martial Hitler and Himmler, but these plans had been abandoned. However, it was clear to everyone that it was necessary to remove them through assassination. I stressed that they could hardly count upon the attitude that had probably prevailed among their present enemies before, unless quick action was forthcoming. Over and over again I underlined how important it was to act without delay. This was the last time that I visited Berlin and my last personal meeting with G. During the winter, spring and summer of 1944, I received several messages from G. which all amounted to saying that the plans were still alive, that the assassination was certain to take place and that I should

stick to our earlier agreement. At the beginning of July, I received a cable from Consul General Siedersleben and Staatssekretär Planck, who wished to pay me a visit around 20 July. My reply was that I would be away on holiday until early August. I then received a new cable that said that it was important that they could see me. I agreed to a meeting in the morning of 22 July. On 20 July, the attempted murder took place. Planck had for some reason replaced Schlabrendorff. He never showed up, but was arrested and executed. G., too, was arrested eventually, as he was on the point of fleeing to Sweden. G. was later on subjected to a number of interrogations (torture?) and was still alive as late as in November. Many people were arrested due to information and notes found with G.

I was warned from several quarters not to go to Germany, because my close co-operation with G. was well-known. In November, I received an invitation to go and see Himmler, which I did not accept. I do not believe that anything would have happened to me, although I do not exclude the possibility that Himmler would ask me to carry out for him the assignment which I had accepted to do for G. The fact that I obviously would refuse to do anything of the sort contributed to my decision not to go.

23 April, 1946

24.12.44

Euer Excellenz

nahm ich mich als ein zum Tode Verurteilter mit gewichtigen Bitten. Mit dem Erkenntnis vom 20.7. habe ich nicht, mit dem Versuche, die Welt von der Geißel dieses Krieges zu befreien, Alles zu tun. Herr Jacob Wallenberg, dem ich seit 10 Jahren nahe stehe, Inskilda Bunker Stockholm, kann Ihnen Näheres erzählen.

Zunächst liegt mir daran, dass die Mitteilungen, die ich Euer Excellenz zugehen lassen habe, so schnell wie möglich und sicher an J. Wallen-

Jag har haft ^{länga} ~~svåra~~ intressanta
 samtal med vår väntade vän,
 som ^{hört} ~~hört~~ mig många saker och
~~hört~~ att jag ej kan få in
^{att} ~~det~~ i ett brev. Han är mycket
 ivrig på att du skall gå till
 Churchill eller Administrationen till
 han personligen. Men det är, som
 du väl känner. Saken är den
 att generalerna vägra att
 handla utan vissa förhands-
 uttalanden. Det första är ^{av-} ~~av-~~
^(Administrationen) ~~av-~~ hållsambet från militära åtgärder
 särskilt luftangrepp ^{från de allierade sidan} ~~(Administrationen)~~
 medan befrielseaktioner i
 Tyskland pågår. De förbinda

Facsimile from draft letter from Jacob Wallenberg to Marcus Wallenberg 21
 May, 1943

London juni 1943.

Memo.

D. M. förklarade att W. C. ej ~~stämde~~ hade en uppfattning
 om krigets förande som kan de betraktas som under alla
 omständigheter oförsonlig eller som kunde betraktas
 som "to the bitter end". Krigsmålen voro klara. Det nazi-
 stiska Tyskland måste krossas. Och denna gång skulle man
 ej stanna vid gränsen utan besätta Tyskland. Dode ville
 D. M. påpeka att W. C. alltid varit försiktig i sina ut-
 talanden rörande Tyskland och icke offentligt eller på
 annat sätt satt tetchetsstocken mellan nazisterna och
 det tyska folket. Typiskt hade ej Eden och ej heller Roose-
 velt varit lika återhållsamma. Där emot hade Stalin
 varit mycket tydlig i markerandet mellan Hitler - Tysk-
 land och tyskar i övrigt och h. o. m. gått så långt att
 han i de olika kommittéerna på andra sidan beskrivit
 tyskarnas soldater som hitleriter. För W. C. stode mål-
 sättningen att med röderna upplyska nazisternas gangster-
 valde som hade letat världen in i detta krig och bringat
 förstörelse, förhug och laglöshet över stora delar
 av Europa och sat hela världen i gräppning. Tryg-
 ghetens säkerhet i förhållandet länderna emellan
 och därmed någon grund för världens återupp-

Now I have a much more important message to give you -
You will recollect that when you were last here you spoke to someone in high circles about certain plans of some of the professional warriors in a neighbouring country unfriendly to mine. Following this conversation you wrote a letter.

You should (or more likely your contact should) reply to these officers to the effect that they should certainly go on with their plans and take the action they contemplate.

Action will be construed as an act of good faith and proof that they are serious people with standing and influence in their country.

Carl Goerdeler. Undated memorandum, which was written in Stockholm on 20 May, 1943. Typewritten.

1. Das deutsche Volk muss und wird sich selbst von einem System befreien, das unter dem Schutz des Terrors ungeheuerliche Verbrechen begeht und Recht, Ehre und Freiheit der deutschen Volker zerstört hat.
2. Im Interesse der ganzen Menschheit muss die Beseitigung dieses Systems so bald wie möglich erfolgen. Bisherige Versuch sind gescheitert. Tausende Deutsche sind hingerichtet und hingefoltert; viele zehntausende schmachten in Konzentrationslagern und Zuchthäusern.
3. Daher ist es wichtig, dass die Befreiungsaktion nicht gestört wird; sonst ist sie im Kriege kaum durchführbar. Truppen des Befreiers dürfen nicht bombardiert werden; in dem Gebiete, das er jeweils befreit hat, dürfen keine Bomben geworfen werden. So muss der Luftkrieg vorläufig gebietsweise aufhören. Der Befreier wird die Beleuchtung der Städte anordnen.
4. Sobald die Aktion beendet ist, wird eine Zivilregierung eingesetzt. Sie wird die Einstellung der Ubootoperationen anordnen.
5. Dies alles ist nur möglich, wenn der Befreier annehmen kann, dass ihm kein unconditional surrender zugerufen wird.
6. Die Regierung wird alle socialen Schichten, alle Konfessionen, alle deutschen Länder repräsentieren.
7. Ein Regent wird die Spitze des Reiches bilden.
8. Das Reich wird eine Verfassung haben. Das Volk wird einen Reichstag wählen. Die deutschen Länder und Berufsstände werden ein Oberhaus bilden.
9. Da Wahlen im Kriege und vor Beruhigung nicht möglich, wird ein vorläufiger Reichsrat gebildet werden, vor dem die Regierung Erklärungen abgibt, Gesetze vorlegt u.s.w.
10. Grundlage von Recht und Ruhe für Deutschland ist die Selbstverwaltung. Die durch das Diktat von Versailles erzwungene Zentralisierung wird aufgehoben. Die deutschen Länder, Kreise und Gemeinden erhalten wieder grösste Selbstverwaltung. Die preussischen Provinzen werden deutsche Länder.
11. Erste Aufgabe ist die Wiederherstellung von Recht, Anstand und Freiheit. Alle Verbrecher, woimmer die Verbrechen begangen sind, werden vom deutschen Volke selbst bestraft. Davon wird die Welt genügend Kunde erhalten. Lynchjustize wird nicht geduldet. Die Partei verschwindet.
12. Reinheit und Gewissenhaftigkeit der Verwaltung werden wieder hergestellt; die Beamten haben nur die Gesetze gerecht auszuführen.
13. In den besetzten Gebieten werden die nationalen Gewalten wieder hergestellt. Die Räumung erfolgt schleunigst mit Rücksicht auf Lage, Erhaltung der Ordnung u.s.w.
14. Die volle Selbständigkeit aller europäischen Nationen wird hergestellt und garantiert. Die deutsche Grenze gegen Polen ist durch Verhandlung festzusetzen. Deutschland verbürgt bei Einigung den Bestand Polens und fördert eine Staatsunion Polen-Litauen. Im Osten von Polen wird das russische Gebiet von 1938 geräumt. Weitere Räumungen nur im Benehmen mit Polen und seinen Verbundeten.

15. Im Westen ist die Sprachgrenze die, die gerecht ist und Ruhe verspricht. Polen und Tchecho-Slowakei werden vollkommen frei, ihre politische und wirtschaftliche Zukunft so zu gestalten, wie ihre Interessen liegen.
16. Deutschland wünscht, dass Finnland bestehen bleibt und ist bereit, dafür ebenso zu kämpfen, wie für die polnische Ostgrenze.
17. Denn westlich dieser Grenze muss sich die europäische Interessen- und Kulturgemeinschaft bilden, unter deren Mitgliedern es nie wieder Krieg geben darf. Wie Russland sich dazu stellt, hängt von Verhandlungen ab.
17. [sic!] Erster Schritt in Europa ist eine europäische Wirtschaftsunion mit ständigem Wirtschaftsrat und klaren praktischen Zielen. (Verkehr, Recht, Währung, Zölle u.s.w.)
Im Rahmen dieser Union möge ein europäisches Wiederaufbauwerk errichtet werden, in dem Deutschland alle Kräfte selbstlos, aber nach vernünftigen wirtschaftlichen Gesichtspunkten einsetzen wird.
18. Diese Union soll ein Gerichtswesen zur Entscheidung von Streiten aller Art und eine Polizei haben.
19. Deutschland tritt einem regionalen gegliederten Weltbund bei, dessen Ziele klar und praktisch sind und der ein Schlichtungsverfahren einrichtet. Hauptaufgabe ist die Errichtung einer Welt-Währungs-Bank.
20. Deutschlands Finanzlage erfordert grösste Abrüstung. Das mögliche Mass richtet sich nach dem Verhältnis Europas zu Russland und nach der Lage im fernen Osten, in dem gemeinsame europäische Interessen auf dem Spiele stehen. Auf Seerüstung wird verzichtet. Deutschland ist bereit, die Luftwaffe zu internationalisieren.
21. Die deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik wird gegen jede Autarkie, gegen jede Staatsplanwirtschaft auf Freiheit des Individuums, auf privaten Unternehmungsgeist, auf freien Wettbewerb und Leistung gerichtet sein. Für eine Uebergangszeit müssen Kontrollen über Preise, Löhne, und Waren weitergehen. Der Staat soll nur für Recht, Anstand und sociale Gerechtigkeit, sowie für gesunde Finanzen sorgen. Das ist der Hauptbeitrag, den er zum Glücke der Menschen leisten kann. Viel wird er den religiösen Gemeinschaften überlassen müssen.
Die Nationalisierung der Bodenschätze wird erfolgen. Die Art ihrer besten Durchführung wird geprüft.
22. Der beste Beitrag zur Stabilisierung der Währungen und zur Wiederherstellung des Gütertauses in der Welt ist die Ordnung des öffentlichen Budgets. Sie zwingt zu grösster Abrüstung.
23. Die deutsche Socialpolitik wird auf Zusammenarbeit mit anderen Völkern grössten Wert legen. Sie wird Kranken-, Invaliden-, Alters-, Unfall-Versicherung fortsetzen. Aber die gewerkschaftlich zusammengefassten Arbeiter werden diese Einrichtungen selbst verwalten, Mitglieder in die Wirtschaftskammer entsenden und in den Betrieben ebenso unterrichtet werden wie Aufsichtsräte. Dazu ist erforderlich, die wirtschaftliche Bildung zu heben.
Die Arbeiter werden wirtschaftliche Unternehmungen genossenschaftlich auf der Grundlage des Weltwettbewerb betreiben können.
24. Die Arbeitslosigkeit wird nicht mit künstlichen Krediten bekämpft werden; die zerrütten die Finanzen. Soweit Unterstützungen notwendig sind, werden sie so finanziert werden, dass die Verantwortung gehoben und der Wille zur Arbeit und zu richtigen Massnahmen gestärkt wird.

25. Die Sozialpolitik wird nicht dazu führen dürfen, die Verantwortung der Eltern und Familien, der Einzelnen für sein Geschick zu vermindern. Der Gegenteil tut not. Hierfür ist die Heiligkeit der Ehre und die Reinheit des Familienlebens unerlässliche Grundlage.
26. Die Erziehung wird wieder auf umfassende allgemeine Bildung und Stärkung der religiösen Kräfte gerichtet sein, ohne die edle Menschlichkeit nicht möglich ist.

Dies ist der Plan. Die zu seiner Durchführung fähigen Menschen besitzt Deutschland zur Genüge.

Aber gerade sie lehnen, die Selbstständigkeit aller anderen Völker achtend und wollend, die Einmischung anderer Völker in deutsche Fragen leidenschaftlich ab.

Wenn man also hört, dass Polen Ostpreussen und Teile Schlesiens verlangt, dass man Einfluss auf das deutsche Erziehungswesen nehmen, dass man im Deutschland tun will, was Deutsche selbst tun müssen und auch allein mit Erfolg tun können, dann muss man schwarz in die Zukunft Europas und der weissen Völker sehen. Denn sie kann nur auf ihren freien Bund, auf Selbstständigkeit und Achtung, nicht auf neue Entwürdigung gegründet werden.

Wir werden Hitler und seine Mitverbrecher allein zur Rechenschaft ziehen, weil sie unsere guten Namen befleckt haben. Aber wir werden dahinter unsere Selbstständigkeit verteidigen.

Translation from German.

1. The German people must, and will, liberate itself from a system that commits horrible crimes under terror; it has ruined the rights, honour and freedom of the German people.
2. This system must be removed as quickly as possible, for the benefit of all mankind. So far, all endeavours have failed. Thousands of Germans have been executed and tortured to death; tens of thousands are languishing in concentration camps and prisons.
3. It is therefore important not to disturb the liberation action, which otherwise can hardly be carried out during the war. The troops of the liberator must not be exposed to bombings nor those areas which have been freed. The aerial war must therefore be temporarily stopped in these areas. The liberator will arrange for lighting in the cities.
4. As soon as the action has been completed a civilian government will be installed, which will provide for the suspension of the submarine operations.
5. All this can only be achieved if the liberator can assume that he will not be subjected to unconditional surrender.
6. The government will represent all social classes, all confessions and all German federal states.
7. A regent will be the head of state.
8. The state will have a constitution and the people will elect a parliament. The German federal states and occupational groups will form an Upper House.
9. As no elections are possible during the war and before the situation has calmed down, a temporary State Council will be established, to which the government will make its declarations, present laws, etc.
10. Autonomy is a fundamental condition for law and order in Germany. The centralization imposed by the Treaty of Versailles will be removed. The German federal states, regional and local administrative districts will be granted extensive autonomy again. The Prussian provinces will become German federal states.
11. The first task is to restore law, respectability and freedom. All criminals, no matter where the crimes were committed, will be punished by the German people itself and the world will be adequately informed about this. Lynch law will not be tolerated. The Party will disappear.
12. The administration will be clean and conscientious again and public officials will act in accordance with law.
13. The national authorities will be re-established in the occupied territories. Evacuation will be implemented as soon as possible taking into account the situation, maintenance of order, etc.
14. Complete independence will be guaranteed and granted to all European nations. The German-Polish border will be fixed through negotiation and, after an agreement has been reached, Germany will guarantee Poland's existence and is in favour of a state union between Poland and Lithuania. In eastern Poland, the Russian territory from 1938 will be evacuated. Further evacuations will only take place after Poland and her allies have been contacted. In the west, the linguistic frontier is the one that is just and that promises calm.
15. Poland and Czechoslovakia will be completely free to form their political and economic future in line with their own interests.
16. Germany wants that Finland shall continue to exist and is prepared to fight for this just as much as for the Polish eastern border.

17. Because to the west of this border, a European community of interests and culture must be formed, among the members of which no war must ever again take place. Russia's attitude towards this will depend upon negotiations.
17. [sic!] The first step to be taken by Europe is a European economic union, with a permanent economic council and clear, practical goals. (Communications, law, currency, customs, etc.). Within the framework of this union a European reconstruction board should be set up, within which Germany unselfishly would apply all her energy, in accordance with prudent, economic guidelines.
18. Such a union shall have a legal system for the settlement of all kinds of disputes as well as a police force.
19. Germany will join a worldwide union, organized by region, with clear and practical goals. It will establish arbitration procedures. Its main purpose is to establish a global foreign exchange bank.
20. Due to Germany's financial position, the greatest possible disarmament is necessary. The extent of this disarmament depends upon Europe's relations with Russia and the situation in the Far East, where common European interests are at stake. Naval armaments will be given up. Germany is prepared to internationalize its air force.
21. Germany's economic policy will be against any form of autarchy and any state-planned economy; instead, it will aim at individual freedom, private enterprise, free competition and efficiency. During a transitional period, prices, salaries and goods must be subject to continued control. The state shall only be responsible for law, respectability and social justice as well as for sound finances. This is the principal contribution that the state can make to the well-being of people. It will have to leave a great deal of things to the religious communities. Mineral deposits will be nationalised and the best way of doing this will be investigated.
22. A well-functioning state budget is the best contribution to both currency stabilisation and a restoration of the exchange of goods in the world. A condition for this is the greatest possible disarmament.
23. German social policy will attach great importance to co-operation with other nations. Health, disability, retirement and personal accident insurance will remain in force, although the unionised workers will administrate these programmes themselves, send their own representatives to the chambers of commerce and be as well informed within the companies as the boards of directors. In order to achieve this it will be necessary to raise the level of economic education. Workers will be able to compete in the world by running business enterprises on a co-operative basis.
24. Unemployment cannot be mastered with the help of artificial credits, which will lead to financial disorder. If subsidies are necessary, these must be financed in such a way that they raise the sense of responsibility and strengthen the will to work and to take proper measures.
25. Social policy must not be allowed to reduce the sense of responsibility among parents, families and individual persons for their own fate. It is rather the opposite that is needed: Keeping the honour and purity of family life holy is of vital importance.
26. Upbringing will once again be aimed at general and comprehensive education and at a strengthening of the religious forces, without which noble humanity cannot exist.

This is the plan. Germany has more than enough people who are capable to implement it.

However, exactly those who respect and wish independence for all other nations passionately refuse any interference in German affairs by other nations.

Thus, when you hear that Poland claims East Prussia and parts of Silesia, that they wish to influence the German educational system, that they wish to do things in Germany which only Germans themselves should do, and can do successfully, then you must be pessimistic about the future of Europe and the white nations. Because this future can only be founded upon their free association, upon independence and respect and not upon a new form of degradation.

We ourselves will call Hitler and his accomplices to account, since they have stained our good name. However, after that we will defend our independence.

Letter from Jacob Wallenberg to Marcus Wallenberg dated 21 May, 1943. This letter is available both in manuscript and in two typewritten copies. The following copy is the corrected version that was sent to Marcus Wallenberg.

Jag har haft långa intressanta samtal med vår väntade vän, som berört så många saker, att jag ej kan få in allt i ett brev. Han är ytterst ivrig på att Du skall gå till Churchill eller åtminstone till hans personlige sekreterare, som Du lär känna. Saken är den att generalerna vägra att handla utan vissa förhandsuttalanden. Det första rör avhållsamhet från militära åtgärder särskilt luftangrepp från de allierades sida /åtminstone västerut/ medan befrielseaktionen i Tyskland pågår /mera precist från den dag de erhålla kännedom att aktionen börjat och över de områden, som befriats eller anslutit sig/. De förbinda sig att under motsvarande tid inställa ubåtskriget så snart de fått makten. Jag har fattat honom så, att de önska ge befolkningen en känsla av att befrielse från Hitler även kommer att betyda fred, varigenom arbetet enormt underlättas. Det andra rör den besvärliga frågan om "unconditional surrender". Ingen militär vill påtaga sig ansvaret och störta Hitler för att sedan omedelbart själv kapitulera. De anse sig ej kunna gå in på detta villkor. Jag har framhållit att Ch. svårligen binder sig i en fråga som så intimt rör vapenstilleståndsförhandlingen. Jag tror de äro villiga att som villkor för vapenstillestånd gå med på utrymmande av alla besatta områden, åtminstone till Polens ostgräns. Om de allierade absolut håller på "unconditional surrender", anse de att det är fairt att klart besked lämnas härom. Hitler må då bli den som tvingas härtill och helt få bära skulden.

Man räknar med att praktiskt taget hela befolkningen ansluter sig till rörelsen. Representanter för arbetarna trycka hårt på men äro hjälplösa utan militärernas medverkan. Visst motstånd på enskilda ställen kommer att göras men mycket militär anses ej behövas för att beseгра detsamma och den står till förfogande under ovannämnda förutsättning.

Den nya regering som bildas skall starkt stödja sig på fackföreningsfolk. Efter befrielseverkets genomförande, vilket beräknas ske på kort tid, skall praktiskt taget inga militärer ingå däri. Namn lämpar sig ej för brev men jag tror att en del äro kända i England. Vår vän känner Churchill och har intet emot att hans namn nämnes till honom personligen, men givetvis får det ej komma ut. Brüning är den som naturligtvis bäst känner personer och förhållanden i Tyskland. Vår vän hoppas att B. om något inträffar snarast blir konsulterad. Vår väns och hans medarbetares principiella inställning till gränsfrågor och dylikt är att de lösas så att i framtiden internationella tvister och irritationer skola så vitt det står i mänsklig makt förebyggas och en säker grund skapas för en varaktig fred. Polen skall givetvis återupprättas. Beträffande dess västra gräns tänka de sig därvid lösning av korridorfrågan och vissa regleringar i Oberschlesien. Tyskland är berett till och önskar europeiskt samarbete, politiskt och ekonomiskt. Frågor såsom internationel bank, valutor, clearing, budgetbalansering, socialpolitik lösas efter moderna principer, som äro eller bliva erkända av de anglosachsiska länderna.

Krigsförbrytarna skola bestraffas av Tyskland självt, som hoppas återvinna en del av sitt förlorade internationella anseende genom det sätt på vilket denna sak kommer att skötas.

Efter internationell överenskommelse skall återuppbyggnadsarbetet i Europa företagas. Tyskland är berett att oegennyttigt insätta alla sina krafter efter förnuftiga ekonomiska linjer.

Avrustning /redan av ekonomiska skäl/ så långt som förhållandena mellan västeuropa och Ryssland gör det möjligt. Praktiskt taget inga tyska krav på flottrustning. Internationalisering av flygvapnet.

Vår vän är av den åsikten, att den ojämförligt lyckligaste avvecklingen av det nuvarande tillståndet i Europa sker genom att anvarskännande tyskar själva befria sitt land från det rådande våldssystemet.

Han avvisar förebråelsen att tyska folket motståndslöst funnit sig i den förskräckliga Hitler regimen i det han påvisar att tusentals människor avrättats och långt över 100.000 finnas i koncentrationsläger. Svårigheterna gentemot en myndighet som behärskar press, radio, polis och alla makt- och propagandamedel äro enorma, och han hoppas därför att stöd i den härmed begärda formen ej förvägras.

Jag är fullt medveten om att det har sina sidor att framföra en sådan här förfrågan. Men kan man vägra ur rent mänsklig synpunkt, då man betänker huru många oskyldiga människor som kunna sparas? Argumentet att barn och barnbarn har nytta av att detta krig utkämpas till sina yttersta konsekvenser är knappast hållbart; vilken människa kan överblicka konsekvenserna? Det rent motsatta är precis lika möjligt. Illvilliga personer kunna utmåla oss som ombud för tyskarna som endast vill rädda dem från en säker undergång. Jag anser icke att detta är riktigt. Den enda som med fog kan förebrå oss att vi handla emot hans intressen är den nuvarande tyska regeringen. Mitt namn bör därför behandlas med största diskretion, fast jag förstår att det måste nämnas för Ch. om Du kommer så långt. Vi taga icke någon ställning till frågan, vi lämna en upplysning om Du så vill. Vi varken kunna eller ha för avsikt att försöka påverka deras beslut. Jag tycker man är skyldig att lämna denna underrättelse, som är nog så intressant och viktig. Jag har naturligtvis hört mer detaljer än jag här kunnat skriva och är beredd om intresse finns att vara utförligare till någon Ch:s förtroendeman här eller på annat sätt.

Naturligtvis kan jag på intet sätt garantera att generalerna handla även om de få de önskade uttalandena ej heller att de komma att ha framgång. Man har rätt att vara skeptisk, så länge som saken varit på tal. Men vår vän är intensiv. Du känner min tidigare uppfattning att frågor ej tjänar något till emedan de ej kunna besvaras. Han skulle själv vilja handla därefter men kan ej förmå sina medhjälpare.

Ingen i Sverige utom en - Du kan nog gissa vem - och den som utskrivit brevet, ha hört ett ord om saken. [En tidigare version har lydelsen: Jag har i denna sak konfererat med E.B. /Erik Boheman/ som privatperson. Ingen i Sverige utom han, jag och A.v.S. /Anna von Sydow/ som utskrivit brevet, har hört ett ord om saken.] Vi lämna eventuellt en engelsk person vissa upplysningar och stå om så önskas till förfogande för att lämna vissa upplysningar till en tysk. Förutsättning är att det sker på sätt att ingen, inclusive oss, blottställes. Detta är ingen förhandling.

Det är, om det kommer därhän, en betydande skillnad om upplysningen till min vän är ett blankt nej eller om den innebär att ingen upplysning kan lämnas. Jag kan tänka mig att denna skillnad skulle kunna betyda en del.

Vill Du noggrannt tänka över detta. Om Du beslutar Dig för att göra något är det kanske dock bäst att vänta tills Ch. kommer hem.

Translation from Swedish.

I have had long and interesting conversations with the friend that we have waited for, touching upon so many things that I cannot get it all into a letter. He is extremely anxious that you should go and see Churchill, or at least his personal secretary whom you supposedly know. As things stand, the generals refuse to act without certain preliminary statements. The first one concerns the Allies' refraining from all military action, particularly air attacks/at least to the west/while the liberation action in Germany is under way/or more precisely from the day on which they are advised that the action has been started and with respect to those areas which have either been freed or joined the action/. As soon as they have grasped the power, they will undertake to suspend submarine warfare during the corresponding period of time. As I have understood him, they wish to give the population the feeling that liberation from Hitler will also mean peace, which will facilitate the task enormously. The second one is concerned with the difficult question regarding "unconditional surrender". No member of the armed forces wishes to assume responsibility for overthrowing Hitler and then immediately have to surrender himself. They consider this condition to be out of the question. I have stressed that Churchill will hardly commit himself on an issue that is so closely connected with the armistice negotiations. I believe they are willing to accept an evacuation of all occupied areas, at least to the eastern border of Poland, as a condition for an armistice. If the Allies are adamant about an "unconditional surrender" they feel it is only fair that they should be given a clear reply to this question. In that case Hitler should be the one that is forced to accept this, taking the whole blame upon himself.

They expect that practically the whole population will join the movement. Worker representatives are urging the issue very hard, but are helpless without assistance from the armed forces. In certain areas they expect to meet some resistance, although they do not reckon that it will take much military strength to overcome it; the military stands at their disposal on the above-mentioned condition.

The new government that will be formed will seek heavy support from the trade unions. After the liberation has been carried out, which is expected to go fast, practically no military will form part of the government. Names are hardly suited for letters, but I believe that some of them are known in England. Our friend knows Churchill and has nothing against his name being personally mentioned to him, although it must not be made known, of course. Brüning is no doubt the person that is best familiar with people and conditions in Germany. Our friend hopes that B. will be consulted as soon as possible if anything should happen. As regards border and similar issues, the opinion in principle held by our friend and his co-workers is that they should be solved so that all future international disputes and sources of irritation be prevented as far as humanly possible in order that a stable foundation for a durable peace be created. Poland shall naturally be re-established. Regarding its western border, they foresee a solution of the corridor issue and certain adjustments in Upper Silesia. Germany is prepared for, and wishes to see, European political and economic co-operation. Issues involving an international bank, currencies, clearing, budget balancing and social policy will be solved in accordance with such modern principles as the Anglo-Saxon countries have accepted, or will accept.

War criminals will be punished by Germany herself, which hopes to regain some of its lost international reputation through the way in which this matter will be handled.

After an international agreement has been reached, European reconstruction work will be initiated. Germany is prepared to devote all her energy to this work in an unselfish manner and in accordance with prudent economic guidelines.

Disarmament /already for economic reasons/ as far as feasible, in view of the relations between Western Europe and Russia. Practically no German demands for naval rearmament. Internationalisation of the air force.

In our friend's opinion, by far the most successful settlement of the present situation in Europe would be if responsible Germans are allowed to liberate their country themselves from the prevailing system of violence.

He rejects the reproach that the German people has submitted to the terrible Hitler regime without resistance by referring to the fact that thousands of people have been executed and far more than 100,000 are in concentration camps. It is extremely difficult to fight an authority that controls the press, the radio and the police as well as all other resources and means of propaganda. He therefore hopes that the support hereby requested will not be refused.

I am fully aware that presenting a request of this kind has its drawbacks. However, from a purely human point of view is it possible to refuse, considering how many innocent people that can be saved? To say that it will be of use to children and grand-children if this war is fought to its ultimate consequences is hardly a tenable argument; what human being could possibly foresee the consequences? The opposite is just as possible. Spiteful people may see us as representatives of the Germans, willing to save them from destruction. I do not consider this to be true. The present German government alone has reason to reproach us for acting against its interests. My name should therefore be treated with utmost discretion, although I realise that it must be mentioned to Ch., if you get that far. We do not take our stand to the issue, but provide information, if you like. We neither can, nor intend to, try and influence their decision. I feel you are obliged to provide this information, which is quite interesting and important. I have naturally learned many more details than I have been able to describe in this letter. If there is an interest, I am prepared to give a more detailed report to any of Ch:s representatives - here or in any other way.

Of course I cannot guarantee that the generals will act if they obtain the statements requested, nor that they will be successful. One has the right to be sceptical, considering for how long this matter has been up for discussion. However, our friend is intense. You know since earlier that I feel that it is no use to put questions, since they cannot be answered. He himself would like to act accordingly, but is unable to persuade his collaborators.

Nobody in Sweden, except one (you can probably guess who) and the person who typed this letter, has heard one word about the matter. [An earlier version read: I have consulted E.B. /Erik Boheman/ as a private person. Nobody in Sweden, except for him, myself and A.v.S /Anna von Sydow/, who typed the letter, has heard one word about the matter.] We may furnish an English person with certain pieces of information and are prepared, if need be, to provide a German person with certain pieces of information, provided, however, that this can be done in a way that does not imperil anyone, us included. This is not a negotiation.

Should it come that far, there is a considerable difference if the information to my friend is a flat refusal or if it means that no information can be provided. I can imagine that this difference would mean a great deal.

Would you please carefully consider this. If you decide to do anything, however, you might have better wait until Ch. returns home.

Marcus Wallenberg's handwritten notes from a meeting with Desmond Morton.

London juni 1943.

Memo.

D.M. förklarade att W.C. ej hyste en uppfattning angående krigets förande som kunde betraktas som under alla omständigheter oförsonlig eller som kunde beskrivas som "to the bitter end". Krigsmålen voro klara. Det nazistiska Tyskland måste krossas. Och denna gång skulle man ej stanna vid gränsen utan besätta Tyskland. Dock ville DM påpeka att W.C. alltid varit försiktig i sina uttalanden rörande Tyskland och icke offentligt eller på annat sätt satt likhetstecken mellan nazisterna och det tyska folket. Tyvärr hade ej Eden och ej heller Roosevelt varit lika återhållsamma. Däremot hade Stalin varit mycket tydlig i markerandet mellan Hitler-Tyskland och tyskar i övrigt och t.o.m. gått så långt att han i de ryska kommunikéerna på sista tiden beskrivit tyska soldater som hitleriter. För W.C. stode målsättningen att med rötterna upprycka nazisternas gangstervälde som hade lett världen in i detta krig och bringat förstörelse, förtryck och laglöshet över stora delar av Europa och satt hela världen i gungning. Ingen framtida säkerhet i förhållandet länderna emellan och därmed ingen grund för världens återuppbyggande och för folkens ekonomiska och sociala trygghet kunde finnas så länge som det nazistiska systemet härskade och möjligheterna för dess återuppståendelse förefunnes. Det vore därför omöjligt att fatta ställning till frågor framställda av ev. tyska revolutionsmakarkandidater vad den allierade inställningen skulle bli mot ett Tyskland rensat från Hitler och hans "gang" av en rörelse under ledning av generaler, ämbetsmän, industrifolk och fackföreningsfolk. Man finge "wait and see". Den revolutionära rörelsen finge genom sina resultat på olika områden visa världen att den avskrivit våld och laglöshet som maktmedel och nazismen som religion och skola, i vars anda den tyska ungdomen uppfostrades. Att tänka sig att från allierat ansvarigt håll i förväg någon välsignelse eller något godkännande skulle ges till någon som helst riktning av anti-Hitlerianska, anti-nazistiska element vore otänkbart, liksom att till dem därifrån någon utfästelse skulle lämnas att om revolutionen lyckades villkoret om "unconditional surrender" skulle bli eliminerat från de allierades krav. D.M. kom härvid in på förhören med de tillfångatagna tyska generalerna, som praktiskt taget alla voro anti-nazister dock av olika styrka och kulör men visade sig trogna till den tyska arméns heders-code, som tydiligen innefattade avståndstagande till varje deltagande i försök att undanröja den nuvarande regimen.

Däremot lämnades av de mera intensiva nazisthatarna upplysningar om fruktansvärda ohyggligheter som begåtts av SS-trupper mot den ryska befolkningen och som väckt avsky och avsmak för att icke säga skam att vara tysk. Enligt upplysning skulle uttagningen till SS ske genom metodisk utgallring av sjukliga element. Inför en rad ungdomar skulle en SS provokatör berätta perversa, sadistiska och grymma historier under det att ansiktsuttrycken på ungdomarna noggrannt studerades. Somliga visade avsky eller avsmak, andra likgiltighet; på vissa anleten avspeglade sig intresse, ögonen lyste och t.o.m. ett belåtet leende lekte kring läpparna. Dessa senare blevo uttagna. Från dessa led rekryterades det fruktade SS, polistrupperna, koncentrationslägrens djävlar och de besatta områdenas plågoandar och bödlar. Ett system som till verktyg har en dylik organisation är en fara ej blott för sitt eget land utan för civilisationen och freden. Ungdom skolad under en dylik regim är ävenledes en fara. Hur komma de nya herrarna i Tyskland att ställa sig till utrotandet av dessa vådliga element? Utan tvekan, fortsatte DM, vore det för Tyskland, för de allierade och för världens framtid bäst om Tyskland självt rensade upp i eget hus och ställde de skyldiga till ansvar. De allierades inställning berodde i hög grad på hur

upprensningsarbetet sköttes och efter vilka linjer som det nya tyska statskicket konstituerades och det eckliastiska arbetet lades. På allierat håll hade man alldeles klart för sig olägenheterna och riskerna av att utlandet ställde de tyska skyldiga till ansvar. Huruvida sedan en revolution fått tillfälle att visa under en period av 3 eller 6 månader - allt beroende på hur snabbt och genomgripande omläggningen kunnat ske - att ett demokratiskt statskick, ordnat rättsväsende, nya skolreformer, religions- och yttrandefrihet införts förutsättningar därefter skapats för en uppgörelse mellan de krigförande som ej innebar Tysklands acceptering av "unconditional surrender" vore givetvis vanskligt att säga. D.M. visste, att WC skulle kunna i och för sig, om den nya tyska regimen ingåve honom förtroende, vara med om en dylik linje. Labour och Vansittartismen voro motståndare. Om samtidigt med det inre reformarbetet man på tyskt håll förklarade sin fredsvilja, sin beredvillighet att utrymma de besatta områdena, att inställa u-båtskriget, att införa lokal civil och inhemsk förvaltning i de ockuperade områdena, att biträda en internationell fredsorganisation, att avrusta sånär som på ett defensivt system och att iakttaga en defensiv attitude under kriget, så trodde D.M. att public opinion både i UK och USA skulle snart svänga till förmån för en uppgörelse. Härtill bidrog förvisso inställningen hos de ledande mot Ryssland, vars avsikter och politik följdes med stort men camouflerat misstroende. På min definitiva fråga om D.M. ansåg en uppgörelse utan "unconditional surrender" omöjlig svarade han kategoriskt nej. W.C. ville ej i onödan förlänga kriget för krigets skull. Nazismens utrotande vore huvudsaken jämte skapandet av garantier för bevarad framtida fred. Jämväl förklarade DM emfatiskt på min fråga att bombning mot revolutionerande orter skulle inställas om endast vederbörlig trovärdig upplysning om förhållandet komme dem tillhanda. D.M. sade att han behövde ej konsultera W.C. ytterligare på dessa punkter. De voro säkra.

Han insåg betydelsen att söka spara mänskligheten ytterliga lidanden. Då jag för honom förklarade att sannolikt kunde man ej förvänta att på så lösa uttalanden de tyska generalerna, som voro patrioter, skulle medverka till Hitlerregimens avskaffande, som i och för sig dock vore ett riskabelt företag, för dem själva såväl som för Tyskland med ett ev. inbördeskrig som följd, eller om de lyckades med ett ev. acceptering av "unconditional surrender" som villkor, sade D.M. att starkare uttalanden skulle nog ej under några omständigheter kunna erhållas. Då han medgav, att det dock jämväl vore ett allierat intresse att en revolt oavsett resultatet gjordes i Tyskland kunde han tänka sig den möjligheten att själv begiva sig till Sthlm för ett sammanträffande med vederbörande tysk och då till denne upprepa vad han till mig sagt. D.M. bad att få understryka att han ej kunde ingå på några som helst förhandlingar utan det vore endast ett informatoriskt samtal om hur man ställde sig på högsta ort till de berörda frågekomplexen.

Under samtalets gång framkom den upplysningen att man 1941 hade haft liknande förfrågningar från tyskt generalshåll. Det faktum att på flera håll och rätt så betydande håll omstörtningssplaner hystes mot en regim med världens förnämligaste polis och Gestapoinstrument utan upptäckt vore enligt DM:s uppfattning ett talande bevis för uppsåtets allvar och ledningens skicklighet. D.M. skulle fundera över frågan och ev. skulle jag innan min avresa återkomma. Vid försök till kontakt mottogs jag ej. Dagen var en lördag och min avresedag och förevändningen p.m.skrivande för WC innan tidig "catch a train from Liverpool Street Station at 12.45."

Translation from Swedish.

London, June 1943.

Memo.

D.M. explained that the views of W.C. on the pursuit of war could not be regarded as relentless or described as “to the bitter end”. The war objectives were clear. Nazi Germany had to be crushed and this time one would not stop at the border but occupy Germany. However, DM wished to point out that W.C. had always made prudent statements regarding Germany, never equating the Nazis with the German people in public or in any other way. Unfortunately, neither Eden nor Roosevelt had been as restrained. Stalin, on the other hand, had made a very clear distinction between Hitler’s Germany and Germans in general and even gone as far as describing German soldiers as Hitlerites in the latest Russian bulletins. To W.C., the goal was to uproot the Nazi gangster rule that had led the world into this war and brought destruction, oppression and lawlessness over large parts of Europe and rocked the whole world. As long as the Nazi system prevailed and as long as there was a chance that it would be restored there was no future security in the relations between nations and thus no basis for the reconstruction of the world and for the economic and social security of the nations. It was therefore not possible to adopt an attitude towards questions from German revolutionary candidates about the Allies’ reaction to a Germany cleansed from Hitler and his gang by a movement led by generals, public officials, industrialists and unionists. One would have to “wait and see”. Through its achievements within various areas, the revolutionary movement would have to show the world that it had dissociated itself from violence and lawlessness as forcible means and from Nazism as religion and school, in the spirit of which German youth was being brought up. To think that the Allies would grant any blessing or approval of any kind of anti-Hitler or anti-Nazi movement in advance was impossible. It was equally impossible to expect any commitment from the Allies to eliminate the condition regarding “unconditional surrender”, if the revolution were successful. In this connection, D.M. drifted on to the interrogations with the captured German generals, who practically all were anti-Nazis, albeit of varying intensity and colour. However, they were faithful to the code of honour of the German army, which apparently meant dissociation from any participation in attempts at removing the present regime.

On the other hand, some of the more intense antagonists of the Nazis provided information about horrible atrocities committed by the SS troops against the Russian population, atrocities which had filled them with loathing and disgust, not to say shame of being Germans. Reportedly, the SS would draft its personnel through a methodical sorting out of sick elements. A provocateur from the SS would tell perverted, sadistic and cruel stories to a group of young people, while their facial expressions were carefully studied. Some of them displayed disgust or aversion, while others remained indifferent; some faces showed interest, with gleaming eyes and even a happy smile on the lips. The latter ones were selected. It was from their ranks that the dreaded SS, police troops, the devils of the concentration camps as well as the tormentors and butchers of the occupied areas were recruited. A system using such an organisation endangers not only its own country, but also civilization and peace. Young people who have been educated under such a regime also represent a danger. What course will the new masters of Germany take with respect to the extermination of these dangerous elements? Undoubtedly, continued D.M., the best thing for Germany, the Allies and the future of the world would be if the Germans themselves put their house in order, calling those guilty to account. The position of the Allies depended to a great extent upon the way in which the purge would be handled and also upon which principles the new German constitution and ecclesiastic work would be founded. The Allies were completely aware about the inconvenience and risks involved, if foreign nations would call the guilty Germans to account. It would of course be hard to

say if a revolution could prove - within a period of three or six months depending upon how quickly and how thoroughly a restructuring could be carried out - that a democratic regime, a sound judicial system, school reforms as well as freedom of religion and speech had been introduced. It would furthermore be difficult to say, if this had created the necessary conditions for the belligerents to reach a settlement without demanding that Germany accept "unconditional surrender". D.M knew that WC would be prepared to support such a line of action, provided the new German regime inspired him with confidence. Labour and the Vansittartism were opposed.

D.M. believed that public opinion in both the UK and the U.S. would soon swing in favour of a settlement, if the Germans declared their will to peace, readiness to evacuate the occupied territories, suspend the submarine warfare, introduce local and civilian internal administration in the occupied territories, support an international peace organisation, disarm except for a defense system and to adopt a defensive attitude during the war, while carrying out internal reform work. Most certainly, a contributing factor to this was leading persons' attitude towards Russia, the intentions and policy of which were observed with great, but concealed, distrust. In reply to my final question, whether D.M. considered a peace agreement without "unconditional surrender" impossible, he answered categorically no. W.C. did not wish to prolong the war unnecessarily, for the sake of war. The most important thing was to exterminate Nazism and to create guarantees for a lasting peace in the future. In reply to my question, D.M. also declared emphatically that all bombing of revolting places would be stopped, if they only were provided with proper and credible information about the situation. D.M. said that he did not need to consult W.C. further as regards these points. They were for certain.

He was aware of the importance of trying to spare mankind from further suffering. I explained that one could hardly expect that the German generals, being patriots, would help to remove the Hitler regime on the basis of such vague pronouncements. Considering how risky a venture this was, both for themselves and for Germany; it might lead to civil war or, if they were successful, to a possible acceptance of "unconditional surrender" as a condition. In reply, D.M. said that stronger pronouncements could probably not be obtained under any circumstances. He admitted, however, that a revolt in Germany, regardless of outcome, was in the interests of the Allies; in consequence, he could imagine that he himself should go to Sthlm for a meeting with the relevant German person and repeat to that person what he had just told me. D.M. wished to emphasise that he was not in a position to enter into any negotiations. It would just be an informative conversation about the attitude of the top leaders towards the questions at issue.

During our conversation, it became clear that similar inquiries had been made by German generals in 1941. In D.M.'s opinion, the fact that several people, including some rather important people, entertained revolutionary plans against a regime with Gestapo and the world's best police force, without being disclosed, was a striking proof of the gravity of the purpose and the skill of the leaders. D.M. was going to consider the issue. Possibly, I was to revert to him before my return trip. When I tried to get in contact I was not received. I was going home on a Saturday. The pretext was writing a memo for WC before "catch a train from Liverpool Street Station at 12.45."

Handwritten notes by Jacob Wallenberg from a meeting in Berlin.

Sammanträffande med Dr. _____ i Berlin den 12 aug. 1943. 1 timmes samtal i Kaiserhofs hall och senare lunch på hotel Hospitz.

Läget i Tyskland har utvecklats så att numera generaler såväl i öster som i väster är villiga att söka bryta nazismen. De anse att detta kan ske utan mycken blodutgjutelse därför att större delen av S.S och polisen kommer att göra gemensam sak med den nya regimen. Även generalstabschefen Jaitzler går sannolikt emot Hitler. Han har haft så mkt svårigheter med honom. Däremot äro sådana män som Manstein Rommel & Rundstedt icke pålitliga. Om kuppen lyckas blev gen. Beck överbefälhavare och sannolikt tills regering hinner bildas riksföreståndare. Den nya regeringen blir ganska stor ty det är önskvärt att samtliga delar av landet bli representerade särskilt blir den sydtyska rep. relativt stark, ty det är nödvändigt för sammanhållningen att Preussen ej dominerar. Dessutom skall byråkrati näringsliv arbetarrörelse & militär representeras. Den nya regeringen önskar så snart som möjligt upptaga kontakt med Engl. USA ha för avsikt att omedelbart t. Stockholm skicka lämplig representant i förhoppning om att denne där kan sammanträffande med engelsk representant. Som ev. tysk repr. nämndes en Hr Schlabbendorff som enl. uppgift är personlig bekant med framstående engelsmän bl.a. Churchill.

Denna kontakt avser dels att förbereda kommande förhandlingar dels erhålla råd ang den politik som bör föras för uppnående av målen d.v.s. krigets upphörande och fred.

Den nya regering avser att omedelbart meddela att den önskar avsluta kriget och att den därför har för avsikt att så möjligt - ur militär synpunkt - utrymma alla besatta områden. Den har för avsikt att ställa den nazistiska regimens representanter till ansvar för de våldshandlingar som den gjorde sig skyldiga till inför ordinarie domstol och med stränghet skipa den rättvisa som är nödvändig.

Lag och rätt och att demokratiskt styrelsesätt skall återinföras. Gränser skola fastställas på ett rättvist sätt och så att en varaktig fred så långt det ligger i mänsklig makt tryggas.

Han hoppas att genom att Tyskl på detta sätt visa sina goda avsikter att även de andra länderna skola anse det rimligt och fördelaktigt att inlåta sig på förhandlingar utan att avkräva den tyska militären kapitulation och utan att belasta det tyska folket med fientlig ockupation. Han önskade av mig att jag skall vara behjälplig med att få kontakt med engelsmännen ev. amerikan. efter en regimförändring.

Han uttryckte en förhoppning om att Berlin skulle skonas från bombanfall ity att skingrande av alla därstädes belägna departement försvårar genomförandet av en regimförändring. Även Leipzig och Stuttgart vore ur denna synpunkt av viss vikt.

Det militära läget för dagen var någorlunda tillfredsställande på ostfronten dock skulle sannolikt någon ytterligare reträttrörelse vara nödvändigt, vartill generalerna även fått tillstånd av Führern. Emellertid hade han borttagit vissa reserver för att skicka desamma till Italien men den ryska trycket hade varit så stort att ett par divisioner som varit på väg t. Italien fått vända om. Führern hade bestämt att Po linjen skall hållas och ditbeordrat trupper. Generalerna synas ej vara övertygade om visheten av detta beslut.

Ett kupp försök kommer sannolikt att göras före d. 15 sept.

Jag meddelade honom att enl. uppgift att Morton skulle luftbombardemang komma att inställas på områden som befriats från naz. så snart tillförlitliga meddelanden erhållits. Jag meddelade att ett tyskt moterbjudande att inställa ubåtskriget ej idag betydde detsamma som för sex månader sedan.

Translation from Swedish.

Meeting with Dr. _____ in Berlin on 12 August, 1943. One hour conversation at Kaiserhof Hall followed by luncheon at the Hospitz hotel.

The development of the situation in Germany has now reached such a point that generals, both in the East and West, are willing to try and crush Nazism. They are of the opinion that this could be done without much bloodshed, since the majority of the S.S. and the police will make common cause with the new regime. Even the Chief of the General Staff, Mr Jaitzler, is likely to oppose Hitler, because of all the trouble he has had with him. In contrast, such men as Manstein Rommel & Rundstedt are not reliable. If the coup is successful, General Beck will be appointed Commander-in-Chief and, pending the formation of a new government, probably also Regent. The new government will be quite large, because it is desirable that all parts of the country are represented. In particular, the South German representation will be relatively strong, since unity requires that Prussia does not dominate. Besides, the bureaucracy, business community, labour movement and military must be represented. It is the wish of the new government to get into contact with England as soon as possible. The U.S.A. intends to send a suitable representative to Stockholm immediately in the hope of arranging a meeting with England's representative. As a possible German representative a Mr Schlabrendorff was mentioned, who reportedly is a personal friend of prominent English people, including Churchill.

The purpose of this contact is both to prepare coming negotiations and to seek advice about the policy to be pursued in order to reach the goals, i.e. to end the war and to establish peace.

It is the immediate intention of the new government to announce its wish to end the war and its plans to evacuate all occupied territories as far as militarily possible. It intends to call the representatives of the Nazi regime to account before a regular court of justice for the acts of violence that it has committed and to administer rigorous justice.

Law, order and a democratic form of government will be restored. The boundaries will be fixed in justice in order to guarantee, as far as humanly possible, a lasting peace.

He hopes that Germany's display of her good intentions in this way would make the other countries consider it reasonable and advantageous to start negotiating without demanding surrender from the German armed forces and without putting a load on the German people in the form of occupation. He asked for my help in establishing contact with the British, possibly the Americans, after a change of regime.

He expressed the hope that Berlin be spared from bomb raids, since the dispersion of all the ministries there would make it more difficult to change regime. Also Leipzig and Stuttgart were of importance in this connection to a certain extent.

At the moment, the military situation on the Eastern front was relatively satisfactory, albeit some further retreat movements probably would be necessary, for which the generals had obtained the Führer's permission. However, he had removed certain reserve troops to send them to Italy, but the Russian pressure had been so great that a couple of divisions on their way to Italy had been forced to turn back. The Führer had decided to maintain the Po line and ordered troops to go there. The generals do not seem convinced about the wisdom of this decision.

A coup d'état will probably be staged before 15 September.

I informed him that according to Morton the air raids would be suspended in all areas that had been freed from the Nazis as soon as reliable information had been received. I told him that a German counter-offer to suspend the submarine war was of less importance today than six months ago.

Handwritten draft letter from Marcus Wallenberg to Desmond Morton.

Aug 13th 1943

Dear Desmond,
London.

In case our last subject of conversation still interests you I would be able to give you some fresh and urgent news as your views have been made known to the interested party. Please reply soonest if you care, assuring me as well that my message can reach you safely without any interception of any kind.

Sincerely yours

Marc

Handwritten letter from Victor Mallet to Marcus Wallenberg.

British Legation,
Stockholm.

Aug 25. 1943.

My dear Marc,

I have been asked to let you know that Desmond Morton thanks you for your letter, which reached him 8 days after despatch.

I hope you're having a good holiday & will be ready for some tennis next week

Yours ever

Victor

Handwritten draft letter from Marcus Wallenberg to Desmond Morton. Undated, but probably written on 6 September, 1943.

Blasieholmstorg 11
Stockholm
Tel. 20 51 50

Dear Desmond,

Encouraged by your acknowledgement of my message as meaning some interest in further news I shall give you some indication of how the wind blows although much has happened since we saw each other and also since my last news. Firstly I believe your way of looking at possible coming events and your likely reaction on such occasion is known by the prospective candidates and fully appreciated by them. There is no more any question of asking any advance expression from you.

The interested parties have come very far in their preparations and in the former half of last month the intention was to have it happen before Sept 15th. Since our information, however, H has been appointed Minister, presumably to give him more powers on the inner front and possibly as a countermeasure against the preparations of the candidates. Outlines over procedure and names in organization has been furnished, showing vastness and scope of plans.

Once the plan is carried through it is their desire to establish some unofficial contact with you, not for the purpose of initiating or conducting any negotiations but solely to be able to give you information of their intentions and plans for the future and also with a hope to receive some impulses from your side as to opportune and adequate measures to reach an end to this war. [I believe that the overwhelming majority of their people and whom these candidates represent have as burning a desire as any of you to restore the fullest democracy, order, and justice in their country and to peacefully pursue a positive international collaboration in all vital and important fields.] Such personal contact could be arranged on neutral territory and their representative would be personal acquaintance of W.C.

At time of information a hope was expressed of saving Berlin in the first place and Leipzig in the second from bombing as this would have facilitated the successful realization of their plans, as a scattering about of the administration favours any possible resistance. But of course that is past history.

Letter from Victor Mallet to Marcus Wallenberg.

British Legation,
Stockholm.

25th September, 1943.

My dear Marc,

I have had a message from Harry asking me to let you know that "Desmond has received your letter of September 6th and wishes you to know that he fully understands it".

Hope to see you soon.

Yours ever,

Victor

Bankdirektören Marcus Wallenberg
Blasieholmstorg 11
Stockholm.

Handwritten letter from Charles Hambro to Marcus Wallenberg.

Great Western Railway
Board Room
Paddington Sta.

29.9.43.

My dear Marc,

Harry showed me your letter to him about telephones in the South and I suggested that you should put your offer of help through the Swedish Minister here. If I went into battle for you about this we should both become suspect as interested parties, whereas if Prytz puts up a helpful proposal it must be listened to. If Prytz keeps in touch with me I can of course put a word in behind the scenes once he has started the ball rolling.

Now I have a much more important message to give you -
You will recollect that when you were last here you spoke to someone in high circles about certain plans of some of the professional warriors in a neighbouring country unfriendly to mine. Following this conversation you wrote a letter.

You should (or more likely your contact should) reply to their officers to the effect that they should certainly go on with their plans and take the action they contemplate.

Action will be construed as an act of good faith and proof that they are serious people with standing and influence in their country.

No undertaking of any kind can be given or expected.

No one must know that you and I are in touch on this matter and above all no one at HM Legation.

From now on you will send all communications in regard to this matter to me by the same route as you receive this letter.

The bearer of it knows nothing and must know nothing. He has instructions to receive & transmit your letters. If the event contemplated really happened it may be possible for someone (perhaps myself) to come and see you.

If there is any further information which you think I should know in regard to this subject please let me have it.

Please forget that you have communicated to anyone but me about this matter.

Good luck to you.

(Probably wise to destroy these pages)

Anis is here & very well except for a rash of a childish kind probably due to a change of diet & the fact that she is "of an age" Nothing to worry about, no fever, she is up & about everywhere.

We are now back in our old home at 9 Princes Gate thank goodness & living like human beings again. with a cook.

I do congratulate you on the result of the negotiation with Jerry V.
Everyone here very pleased and I believe in the long run Sweden will benefit greatly for taking the line she has done.

I was delighted with your optimism about the war. I agree with you

All best regards to Madame & a hundred messages to the "poiken"

Yours ever

Charles. Hambro.

Handwritten letter from Charles Hambro to Marcus Wallenberg.

19.10.43

Great Western Railway,
Board Room,
Paddington Station, W.2.

My dear Marc.

Just a line to tell you Anis is now quite recovered from her skin trouble about which I wrote in my last letter. She has gone back to school. I also thought you might like to know that the other information and guidance which I gave you in connection with your enquiries was approved by more important people than I before I passed it to you. It was not the production of my own sweet imagination.

Just had a wonderful 8 days holiday with Anis & Doie at Hedgend. Lovely weather and plenty of pheasants & partridges to shoot. First real holiday I have had for about 3 years. Wish you had been there to help as I wanted another gun very badly. I am lunching with Mike Wheeler & John Batt tomorrow so may hear some news of you & Sweden. I would love an excuse to come & see you!!

My best regards to herself.

Yours

Charles.

Letter from Carl Goerdeler to Jacob Wallenberg. Typewritten.

8.11.44.

Verehrter Herr Wallenberg,

- 1) Meine ganze Familie, unschuldig und unwissend, Frau und Kinder, Brüder und deren Kinder, Enkel, ist seit 3 Monaten in Haft (Sippenhaft).
 Ich bitte Sie und Herrn Dr. Lickfett, sich meiner Frau und meiner 4 Kinder anzunehmen. Ihren Aufenthalt kann das Reichssicherheitshauptamt Berlin SW 11, Prinz Albrechtstr. 8 angeben. 2 Söhne sind Soldaten. Da mir mein ganzes Vermögen, auch Wäsche und Anzüge, genommen ist ebenso jedes Einkommen, stehen meine Frau und meine Kinder vollkommen mittellos da. Später wird Bosch einspringen.
 Ich bitte zu prüfen, ob Sie nicht meine ganze Familie nach Schweden nehmen können, bis die Verhältnisse sich geklärt haben. Dann müssten auch meine beiden Söhne [sic!] mitgenommen werden, die Soldaten sind und deren Stellung zur Zeit ohnehin sehr schwierig ist. Die deutsche Regierung wird mit sich reden lassen, wenn ihr Schweden eine Kompensation durch Austausch mit Offizieren anbietet, die in Schweden interniert oder in England kriegsgefangen sind, und wenn Schweden sich verpflichtet, dass meine Familie sich jeder politischen Tätigkeit enthält. Meine Familie wird alle Arbeit übernehmen, die man von ihr verlangt. Ich bitte Ihre und die englische Regierung sowie Seine Kgl. Hoheit Ihren Kronprinzen herzlich, dass im Interesse der Menschlichkeit alles versucht wird, um meiner unglücklichen Familie [sic!] zu helfen.
- 2) Bei dem Verlag Reclam in Leipzig liegt das Manuskript einer von mir verfassten "Wirtschaftsfibel". Sie legt in volkstümlicher Fassung mit Bildern die ehernen Gesetze dar, die die Wirtschaft beherrschen. Ich habe festgestellt, dass die jungen Arbeiter sie vollkommen verstehen. Halten Sie mich nicht für überheblich. Diese Fibel, in der ich alle meine Erfahrungen zusammengefasst, ist geeignet, die vielen wirtschaftlichen Irrlehren zu entthronen, die in den letzten Jahrzehnten die Köpfe (selbst Lord Keynes) verwirren und ins wirtschaftliche soziale und politische Elend zu stürzen im Begriffe sind. Reclam (Direktor Müller) wird das Buch sofort nach Kriegsschluss drucken. Wenn das in Deutschland nicht möglich, bitte ich Sie - Reclam hat in Stockholm Geschäftsverbindungen - das Manuskript nach Schweden zu schaffen und dort zu drucken. Es müsste in alle Sprachen übersetzt werden. Dann besteht Aussicht, dass die Welt wieder gesund denken lernt. Ihr grosser Landsmann Kassel wird das bestätigen. Ich bitte Sie herzlich, Ihre Tatkraft daran zu setzen. Der Erlös soll meiner Frau zufließen oder meinen ältesten lebenden Nachkommen; sie werden Ihnen und Dr. Lickfett Ihre für meine Familie gemachten Auslagen ersetzen, soweit es nicht Bosch tut.
- 3) Es ist höchste Zeit, dass der Krieg beendet wird. Die wertvollen europäischen Völker verbluten sonst, die Trümmer werden grösser als die Möglichkeiten des Wiederaufbaus, die Staatsschulden wachsen ins Phantastische. Der lachende Dritte wird der russische Bolschewismus. Dem muss und kann ein Ende bereitet werden. Das kann nur geschehen, wenn unser Plan verwirklicht wird. England, U.S.A. und Deutschland müssen sich versöhnen. Da England auf den Sturz des Nati[o]nalsozialismus nicht rechnen kann, muss es mit dem jetzigen Deutschland Waffenstillstand schliessen. Der Kampf gegen dem Nationalsozialismus kostet ihm sonst seine ganze Zukunft; Russland steht in Skandinavien, auf dem Balkan, an den

Dardanellen, vor Persien, vor Indien und hat, sich später mit Japan vereinend, den Schlüssel in Ostasien in der Hand!! So und nicht anders ist es. Europa nähert sich schnell einem Zustand, in dem es unfähig wird, den U.S.A., dem Empire und Südamerika die überschüssigen Rohstoffe und Ernten abzunehmen. Die allgemeine Katastrophe ist bei Fortsetzung des Krieges unvermeidbar.

Also muss England den National-Sozialismus dulden; dann kann es auch die polnische Frage lösen. Ich habe den Europa rettenden, England und U.S.A. befriedigenden Friedensplan fertig. Ich weiss, dass die Nazis, die unter meinem im Gefängnis ausgeübten Einfluss das Kriegsziel bereits begrenzt haben, mitmachen würden, die notwendigen inneren Reformen in Deutschland folgen automatisch, wenn meine Freunde und ich am Leben bleiben. Da wir zum Tode verurteilt sind, muss schnell gehandelt werden.

Da weder England noch Deutschland das erste Wort sprechen können, muss Schweden es tun. Schweden ist dazu berufen, weil es selbst von Russland bedroht ist. Zunächst muss alles hinter den Kulissen, Russland verborgen, vorbereitet werden. Ich beschwöre Sie, sofort die Initiative zu ergreifen.

Als erstes muss Ihre Regierung der deutschen mitteilen, dass sie unter zwei Bedingungen die Initiative ergreifen würden:

1. Absolutes Schweigen.
2. Meine und meiner Freunde Begnadigung, weil diese und unsere Mitwirkung in England und U.S.A. unentbehrlich ist. (Es handelt sich um Schacht, Popitz, Schulenburg, Halder, Bismarck, führende deutsche Sozialdemokraten, Katholiken und mich). Die Nat.Soz. we[r]den, wenn Ihre Regierung fest bleibt, darauf eingehen, und Schweden rette Europa, die Welt, die Menschlichkeit und die Kultur. Retten Sie, aber sofort! Ich rate Ihnen mit dem Papst und Dr. Gisevius in Zürich Verbindung zu nehmen. Er is mein deutscher Freund und Freund des Vertrauensmann von Roosevelt in Bern. Seine Adresse ist diesem und der Schweizer Fremdenpolizei bekannt. Machen Sie ihn mit meinem plan bekannt, er wird Sie vorzüglich unterstützen. Ebenso mein Freund, der diesen Brief Ihrem Gesandten in Berlin bringt. Alles steht auf dem Spiel, auch die zukunft Ihres Vaterlandes. Alles ist zu retten, wenn Sie meine Bitte erfüllen, sonst alles verloren.

Haben Sie Dank! Gott segne Sie!

Ihr G o e r d e l e r.

Translation from German.

8.11.44.

Dear Mr Wallenberg,

1) Innocent and without knowing the reasons, my whole family – my wife and children, brothers and their children and grandchildren - is under arrest (prosecution of family members of political opponents) for three months already.

I ask you and Mr Lickfett to take care of my wife and four children. The State Security Office in Berlin, SW11, Prinz Albrechtstrasse 8 can inform you about their whereabouts. Two sons are soldiers. Since all my property has been taken away from me, even my underwear and suits as well as my income, my wife and children are completely without means. Bosch will take my place at a later stage.

I ask you to investigate whether you could take my whole family to Sweden until the situation has become clearer. If so, my two sons, who are soldiers and whose situation is very difficult anyway, must be brought along. The German Government can be persuaded if Sweden offers compensation in the form of an exchange of officers, who are either interns in Sweden or taken prisoners in England, if Sweden guarantees that my family will abstain from any kind of political activity. My family will accept any work that might be imposed on them. I sincerely ask your Government and the Government of England as well as His Royal Highness your Crown Prince not to spare any efforts in order to help my unhappy family, in the interests of mankind.

2) The publishing house Reclam in Leipzig has the manuscript of an “economic ABC-book” that I have written, which presents the firm laws that control the economy in a popular way, including pictures. I have made sure that young workers will understand it in full. I hope that you will not find me pretentious. The purpose of this book, in which I have summarised all my experience, is to dethrone all the false economic doctrines that have confused people over the last decades (including Lord Keynes) and that threaten to bring about economic, social and political misery. Reclam (Mr Müller, Manager) will have the book printed as soon as the war is over. If it will be impossible to do this in Germany – Reclam has business connections in Stockholm - I ask you to bring the manuscript to Sweden and have it printed there. It should be translated into all languages. Then, there is still a chance that the world will learn to think soundly again. Your great compatriot, Mr Kassel, will certify this. I sincerely ask you to devote all your energy to implement this. The income should go to my wife or my oldest living descendants; they will compensate you and Dr. Lickfett for all expenses you incur for my family, unless Bosch will do so.

3) It is high time that the war be brought to an end. If not, the precious European nations will bleed to death, the ruins will be larger than the possibilities of reconstruction and public debt will grow out of all proportion. Russian Bolshevism will be the laughing third party, to which an end must, and can, be put. This can only be achieved if our plan is carried out. England, the U.S.A. and Germany must become reconciled with each other. Since England cannot reckon with an overthrow of National Socialism, she will have to negotiate a cease-fire with Germany of today. The fight against National Socialism will otherwise cost her her entire future; Russia is present in Scandinavia, in the Balkans, at the Dardanelles and is on the doorsteps of Persia and India. Together with Japan, Russia will later have the key to East Asia in her hand!! That is how it is and how things stand. Europe is rapidly approaching a situation in which she will be unable to purchase raw material and crops from the U.S.A., the Empire and South America. A total catastrophe will be unavoidable if the war continues.

Thus, England has to put up with National Socialism; then, she will also be able to solve the Polish question. I have prepared a peace plan that will rescue Europe and satisfy

England and the U.S.A. I know that the Nazis, who already have limited their war objective, influenced by me from prison, are prepared to accept it; the necessary internal reforms in Germany will follow automatically, if my friends and myself remain alive.

Since we have been sentenced to death, rapid action is of essence.

Since neither England nor Germany can take the initiative, Sweden will have to do so. Sweden is called to do this, since she herself is threatened by Russia. First, everything has to be prepared behind the scenes and kept secret from Russia. I beseech you to take the initiative without delay.

To start with, your Government must advise the German Government that it will take the initiative on two conditions:

1. Absolute secrecy.
2. Amnesty for me and my friends, because this as well as our co-operation in England and the U.S.A. are indispensable. (Those people I refer to are Schacht, Popitz, Schulenburg, Halder, Bismarck, leading German social democrats, catholics and myself.). The National Socialists will accept this if your Government insists and Sweden would save Europe, the world, mankind and culture. Please save, but fast! I advise you to get in touch with the Pope and with Dr. Gisevius in Zurich, who is a German friend of mine as well as the friend of Roosevelt's representative in Bern. His address is known to the last-mentioned person and also to the Swiss Aliens Commission. Please let him know my plan. He will support you in an excellent way. So will my friend, who brings this letter to your Envoy in Berlin. Everything is at stake, even the future of your country. Everything can be saved, if you grant my request. If not, everything is lost.

Please accept my thanks! God bless you!

Yours truly,
G o e r d e l e r.

Carl Goerdeler's handwritten letter.

24.12.44

Euer Exzellenz

nahe ich mich als ein zum Tode Verurteilter mit gewichtigen Bitten:

Mit dem Attentate vom 20.7. habe ich nichts, mit dem Versuche, die Welt von der Geissel dieses Krieges zu befreien, Alles zu tun. Herr Jacob Wallenberg, dem ich seit 10 Jahren nahe stehe, Enskilda Banken Stockholm, kann Ihnen Näherer erzählen.

Zunächst liegt mir daran, dass die Mitteilungen, die ich Euer Exzellenz zugehen lasse oder liess, so schnell wie möglich und sicher an J. Wallenberg gelangen. Denn es ist höchste Zeit, dass der Krieg beendet wird; sonst ist Europa verloren.

Ich habe meine in der ganzen Welt gesammelten Erfahrungen in den letzten 4 Monaten der Haft bei der Gestapo gewaltig erweitert. Das deutsche Volk wird in raffinierter Weise von der Aussenwelt abgesperrt und so satanisch unterrichtet, die Partei erhält ihre Macht durch gut bezahlte, bestens gepflegte, schwer bewaffnete Kräfte so lückenlos aufrecht, dass irgend ein Erwachen und Erheben im Innern ausgeschlossen ist. Ich will Ihnen ein Beispiel nennen. Das Volk wird zwar täglich über die Absichten der Gegner unterrichtet, Deutschland zu vernichten; aber über den Grund dieser Hasses, die erbarmungslose Hinmordung der Juden, selbst der Kinder, die zahlreichen Untaten in den besetzten Gebieten, die Unterdrückung der Freiheit mit Quisling und Muessert erfährt das Volk nichts. So hat die Partei erreicht, dass das deutsche Volk sich von aussen verfolgt wähnt und der jetzigen Führung folgt, nur dumpf fühlend, dass etwas nicht in Ordnung ist.

Und doch kann das Volk sein Wesen nicht verleugnen. Ich höre und spreche hier viel Beamte der Gestapo. Alle sehnen das Ende des Krieges herbei; 2/3 sind voll böser Ahnungen; 1/3 sieht vollkommen klar und ist erbittert, dass es dieser höllischen Maschine machtlos ausgeliefert ist. Steht es bei der Gestapo so, so kann man sagen, dass mehr als die Hälfte des Volkes verbittert und enttäuscht ist, aber insbesondere nach dem 20.7. schweigt, duldet und opfert, ohne etwas zu wagen.

Euer Exzellenz wollen daraus folgendes schliessen:

1. Jede Möglichkeit, innere Kräfte des anständigen deutschen Volkes gegen Wahnsinn und Verlogenheit mobil zu machen, ist erloschen, wenn es nicht gelingt, die seit dem 20.7. Inhaftierten und Verurteilten zu retten. Diese (Schacht, Minister Popitz, Dr. Löser, Generalober[s]t Halder, Generaloberst Fromm, General Thomas, Herbert Göring, der Vetter des Marschalls, Pfarrer Bonhöfer, Pfarrer Rasmussen, ich u.A.) haben noch die Möglichkeit, im rechten Moment so zu wirken, dass die Entwirrung erleichtert wird. Diese Rettung ist aber auch notwendig, damit Deutschland noch eine Europa rettende aussenpolitische Lösung erzielen kann. Denn auf mich werden meine zahlreichen englischen und amerikanischen Freunde, Staatsmänner, Politiker und Wirtschaftler, hören und einige auch noch auf Schacht, auf Popitz, Halder u.A.

2. Der rettende Anstuss kann nur von aussen erfolgen. Ich glaube die beiderseitigen Kräfte zu kennen. Da mein Volk durch die ihm mitgeteilten Aufteilungspläne aufs Äusserste gereizt ist, wirft es jetzt die letzten Reserven (16jährige und Frauen) in den Kampf; in 3 Monaten haben wir Hunger; hier hungern wir jetzt schon. Geht der Krieg weiter, so werden die Kriegführenden gegenseitig die letzten Menschenreserven aufreiben, die letzten Vermögenswerte zerstören oder verbrauchen, aber auch die letzten moralischen Kräfte. Hunger, Elend und Verzweiflung werden um sich greifen. Der einzige Nutzniesser ist dann der Bolschewismus. Deutschland, das wirtschaftlich noch bürgerlich ist, kann ihm dann nicht mehr entgentreten. England hat jetzt schon Russland in seine

wichtigsten Interessengebiete einmarschieren lassen müssen und nähert sich auch der materiellen Erschöpfung. USA haben in Ostasien alle Hände voll zu tun.

Ich sehe dann eine Katastrophe für ganz Europa voraus, der sich auch Ihr schönes blühendes Land nicht entziehen kann; es wird in sie hineingerissen. Daher verlangt das Interesse der europäischen Kulturwelt, dass dieser sinnlos gewordene Krieg sofort beendet wird. Auch das wahre Interesse der Anglo-Amerikaner und Deutschlands, sowie Schwedens und der Schweiz geht eindeutig in diese Richtung. Ja, Deutschland muss noch fähig bleiben, Russland aus Skandinavien und Finnland, aus den Baltenstaaten und Polen sowie aus dem Balkan zu vertreiben.

Diese Wendung der Dinge gilt es herbeizuführen, Euer Exzellenz. Sie allein ermöglicht es auch England, Polen wiederhergestellt zu sehen. Dass also England gern eine Schwenkung macht, erscheint mir sicher, die dauernden Übergriffe Russlands geben ihm auch die taktische Handhabe.

Das Problem ist nur, sie zur Verhandlung mit der nat.-sozialistischen Regierung zu bringen. Dies ist nach meinen Darlegungen jetzt unerlässlich. Will England den Krieg bis zum Sturz des National-Sozialismus fortsetzen, so bezahlt es diesen Erfolg mit dem Verlust seiner Stellung in Asien an Russland. Ein solcher Selbstmord kann offenbar nicht Ziel der Politik sein.

Ich traue mir nun zu, meine englischen Freunde überzeugen zu können, dass sie auf diesen Sturz verzichten und ihn der Entwicklung überlassen. Es kommt. Ich sehe überall Anzeichen dafür, dass der N.S. selbst umlernt. Die ungeheuerlichen Aufgaben der Zukunft (Wiederaufbau, gigantische Schulden) lassen sich auch nur noch mit Sachkunde und Erfahrung lösen.

Ich glaube, mich für eine mit dem Völkerrecht übereinstimmende deutsche Politik verbürgen zu können.

Nun aber bedarf eine solche allseitige Regsamkeit zur Beendigung des Krieges eines wirksamen Anstosses. Euer Exzellenz, dieser könnte nur von schwedischer Seite ausgehen. Ehe aber Se. Majestät, der schwedische König hervortritt, müssten Vorsondierungen erfolgen. Schon diese müssen aber zur Bedingung stellen, dass die deutsche Regierung eine Voll-Amnestie für den 20.7. ausspricht und mir, auch Schacht gestattet, mit einem schwedischen Vertrauensmann zu sprechen. Man kann eine solche Bedingung sehr gut mit dem Hinweis begründen, dass ohne Einschaltung solcher Männer und ohne entsprechende Haltung der deutschen Regierung an irgend eine Plattform mit England nicht zu denken sei. Denn Schacht und ich sind immerhin Repräsentanten des bürgerlichen Deutschland!

Im übrigen weiss ich, dass man hier sofort darauf einschwenken würde; denn trotz aller grossen Worte würde man gern zum Schluss kommen. Euer Exzellenz, die Rettung der letzten bürgerlichen Politiker Deutschlands ist also möglich, ins besondere wenn Se. Majestät der König einen Wunsch mit entsprechender Andeutung seines Sinnes ausspricht oder aussprechen lässt. Zunächst aber genügt es, wenn Wallenberg um die Genehmigung ersucht, mich zu sprechen, um meine Meinung über die Lage zu hören. Er oder die Stelle, die es für ihn tun muss, wird keine Ablehnung erfahren, wenn sie andeuten, dass eine solche Besprechung dann vielleicht zu weiteren bedeutsamen Fühlungen mit Vertrauensleuten der Regierung führen könnte.

Mein Vorschlag ist ungewöhnlich, aber die Lage Europas erscheint mir so verzweifelt, dass alles gewagt werden muss, um sie zu retten. Euer Exzellenz werden den richtigen Weg wissen, auf dem die Begegnung Wallenbergs mit mir eingefädelt werden könnte. Die deutsche Regierung ist nicht empfindlich; war doch Hitler selbst wegen Hochverrats auf Festung und schwerer wäre ich auch nicht bestraft, wenn in Deutschland noch Recht herrschte; aber der Prozess vor dem Volksgericht war eine Farce.

Exzellenz, ich beschwöre Sie, Sich nicht zu versagen! Noch kann Europa, auch Ihr schönes Land gerettet werden, das ich so sehr liebe. Aber nur sehr wenige Deutsche geniessen in England und USA das erforderliche Vertrauen; leicht wird auch mir nicht werden, die Engländer und Amerikaner zu gewinnen. Aber da mein Plan alle Lebensinteressen befriedigt und die Gesundung der Welt auf bürgerlicher Grundlage ermöglicht, und da sie ihn kennen und grundsätzlich billigen, da es eine andere Rettung nicht giebt und man mich ruhig sprechen lassen wird, so werde ich ein ruhiges Gespräch und in seinem Verlaufe auch mit Gottes Hilfe den Erfolg erreichen, namentlich wenn mir Ihr mir gut bekannter und von mir hoch verehrter Kronprinz etwas hilft.

Ich bitte Euer Exzellenz, Wallenberg zu unterrichten und zu grüssen; ich bitte ihn auch, sich meiner Familie in Leipzig anzunehmen, die z.Zt. in Sippenhaft (!) und schutzlos ist. Auch für sie, die vollkommen unschuldig mittelalterlich behandelt wird, würde eine blosser Erkundigung Se. Kgl. Hoheit des Kronprinzen Wunder wirken.

Wenn Euer Exzellenz meinen Vorschlag für nicht realisierbar halten, dann muss ich versuchen, einen Weg zu gehen, der mich und einen Begleiter in Euer Exzellenz Asylschutz führt. Auf diesen hoffe ich rechnen zu dürfen, nicht nur aus Gründen der Menschlichkeit, sondern auch weil ich dann den Versuch machen muss, von draussen auf beide Seiten zu wirken. Auch davor würde ich mich nicht scheuen, da ich immer die Erfahrung gemacht habe, dass es aus jeder Situation einen Ausweg gibt, wenn man ihn mit Fleiss und Gebet sucht. Hier aber, wo das Glück ganz Europas und ganzer Generationen auf dem Spiele steht, werde und darf ich das Äusserste nicht scheuen.

In ernster Stunde und mit ernstesten Bitten habe ich die Ehre zu sein Euer Exzellenz in vorzüglicher Hochachtung ergebener

Goerdeler

P.S. Ich bitte um vollkommene Verschwiegenheit; dieser Brief gelangt auf heimlichen Wege an Euer Exzellenz. Der Überbringer verdient jedes Vertrauen und ich empfehle ihn Herrn Wallenbergs künftiger Sorge, bis meine deutschen Freunde diese übernehmen können und werden.

Translation from German.

24.12.44

Your Excellency,

As a person that is sentenced to death, I turn to you with an important request:

I had nothing to do with the attempted coup of 20 July. I had everything to do with the attempt to save the world from the scourge of this war. For ten years I am close to Mr Jacob Wallenberg, Enskilda Banken, Stockholm. He can provide you with more details.

To begin with, I am anxious that the messages that I send, or have sent, to you, your Excellency, will reach J. Wallenberg as quickly and safely as possible, because it is high time that the war comes to an end. If not, Europe will be lost.

During the last four months of Gestapo arrest, the experience that I have gained in the whole world has been expanded to a very great extent. The German people is ingeniously isolated from the outside world and instructed in such a diabolical way; the party gets its power through well-paid, well-bred and heavily armed forces so completely that no awakening or uprising within the country is possible. I will give you an example. Every day, the people is informed about the adversary's intentions of destroying Germany; but they hear nothing about the enemy reasons, about the merciless killings of Jews and even of children, the numerous evil deeds in the occupied territories, the suppression of freedom, with Quisling and Muessert. In this way, the party has managed to make the German people believe that it is persecuted by the outside world and made it follow the present leaders, with just a vague feeling that something is not in order.

Nevertheless, the people cannot disown its essence. I listen to, and talk a lot with Gestapo employees. Everybody longs for the war to end; two thirds of them have their misgivings; one third sees everything quite clearly and is bitterly upset about being left at the mercy of this infernal machine. If this is so within the Gestapo, it is safe to say that more than half the people is embittered and disappointed, although, particularly after 20 July, people keep quiet, are patient and making sacrifices without daring to do anything.

Your Excellency could draw the following conclusions from this:

1. Every possibility to mobilise decent German people's inner forces against the madness and mendacity is ruled out, unless those imprisoned and sentenced after 20 July can be rescued. These people (Schacht, Minister Popitz, Dr. Löser, Colonel General Halder, Colonel General Fromm, General Thomas, Herbert Göring, cousin of the Field-Marshal, vicar Bonhöfer, vicar Rasmussen and myself, among others) still have the possibility to act at the right moment and help disentangle the situation. However, it is also necessary to carry out this rescue operation in order that Germany may find a foreign policy solution that can save Europe. My numerous English and American friends, statesmen, politicians and business leaders will listen to me and some will listen to Schacht, Popitz and Halder, among others.
2. A liberation initiative can only come from abroad. I believe that I know the forces on both sides. Since Germany has now been provoked to the utmost through the plans of dividing the country she is now throwing in her last reserves into action (16-year old boys and women); within three months we will be starving; here, we already starve. If the war continues, the belligerents on both sides will mobilise their last human resources, ruin or wear out not only their last valuable assets but also their moral assets. Hunger, misery and despair will spread and only Bolshevism will be able to take advantage of that. Germany, which still is a bourgeois country from an economic point of view, will not be able to oppose the Bolsheviks any longer. England has already now been forced to allow Russia access to her most important areas of interest

and is also on the verge of economic exhaustion. The U.S.A. is fully occupied in East Asia.

I foresee a catastrophe for the whole of Europe, which not even your own beautiful and prosperous country can escape, but will be drawn into. In the interests of European civilization, it is therefore imperative that an immediate end be put to this senseless war. Anglo-American and German true interests as well as those of Sweden and Switzerland clearly point in this direction. Yes, Germany must remain capable of expelling Russian from Scandinavia and Finland, from the Baltic states and Poland as well as from the Balkans.

Your Excellency, it is necessary to achieve this change of direction. Only this will allow England to witness the restoration of Poland. It seems certain to me that also England is ready to change opinion. Russia's continued outrages will also serve as a tactical pretext.

The only problem is how to bring them to negotiate with the National-Socialist government, which, as far as I can see, is now inevitable. If England wants to continue the war until National-Socialism has been crushed, she will have to pay for this by giving up her position in Asia to Russia. Obviously, her political objectives cannot be that suicidal.

I trust that I can convince my English friends to abandon their plans to crush Nazism and leave that to the course of events. It will come. Everywhere, I see indications that National-Socialism itself is in for a reorientation. Also, the enormous tasks of the future (reconstruction, gigantic debts) can only be solved with the help of expertise and experience.

I believe that I can guarantee a German policy in conformity with international law.

However, an efficient stimulus is needed in order to mobilise such a general action to end the war. Your Excellency, such a stimulus can only come from Sweden. But before His Majesty, the King of Sweden, appears, preliminary soundings must be taken. These must make it a condition that the German Government grant full amnesty for the 20th of July and allow me as well as Schacht to talk with a Swedish representative. It is quite easy to justify such a condition by referring to the fact that no common basis whatsoever could be established with England without involving such people and without such an attitude on the part of the German Government. Because, after all, Schacht and myself represent non-Socialist Germany!

Besides, I know people here are prepared to change their minds immediately; despite all big words, people are anxious to end this situation. Your Excellency, it is thus possible to save Germany's last non-Socialist politicians, particularly if His Majesty, the King, expresses, or lets express, a wish in a similar vein. To start with, however, it will suffice if Wallenberg asks for permission to speak with me in order to hear my views on the situation. He, or the agency that will do it in his place, will not be met with a refusal, if they intimate that such a talk might lead to further important contacts with Government representatives.

My proposal is unusual, but I feel that the situation in Europe is so desperate that one has to take every chance in order to save her. Your Excellency, you know how a meeting between Wallenberg and myself could be arranged in the best way. The German Government is not touchy; Hitler himself was punished to confinement in a fortress for high treason and I would not have been punished any harder, if law and justice had still ruled in Germany. The trial before the People's Court was a farce.

Your Excellency, I appeal to you: please do not refuse! Europe can still be saved as well as your own beautiful country that I love so dearly. However, there are very few trusted Germans in England and the U.S.A.; I myself will not find it easy to win over the English and Americans. But since my plan meets all vital interests and makes world recovery on a

non-socialist basis possible; since you know and approve my plan in principle, since there is no other way of saving and since I will be allowed to speak discreetly, I will have a discreet talk and, with God's help, I will be successful, in particular if your Crown Prince, whom I know well and highly respect, will help me a little.

Your Excellency, I ask you to inform Wallenberg and to give him my regards; I also ask him to take care of my family in Leipzig, which is kept in prison (!) at present and left without protection. Also for my family, which is completely innocent but treated in a medieval way, a mere inquiry on the part of His Royal Highness, the Crown Prince, would do wonders.

Your Excellency, if you consider it impossible to realise my proposal I will have to try and find a sanctuary for myself and a companion with you, Excellency. I hope that you will allow me to reckon with this possibility, not only for reasons of humanity but also because I will then have to try and influence both sides from outside. I will not hesitate to do so, because I have learnt that there is always a way out of every situation if you search for it with the help of hard work and prayers. This is a situation in which I neither will nor must hesitate to do my utmost, since the prosperity of Europe and of entire generations is at stake.

Your Excellency, in a dark hour I most sincerely appeal to you and remain,
Yours faithfully,

Goerdeler

P.S. I request absolute secrecy; this letter will reach your Excellency through secret channels. The bearer of this letter is worthy of every confidence and I recommend him to Mr Wallenberg's care in the future, until my German friends are in a position to take care of him, which they also will do.

Notes

1. Allen Welsh Dulles, *Germany's Underground*. New York 1947. Hans Rothfels, *Die deutsche Opposition gegen Hitler. Eine Würdigung*. Zurich 1994. English edition 1947. Gerhard Ritter, *Carl Goerdeler und die deutsche Widerstandsbewegung*. Stuttgart 1984. First edition published in 1954.
2. Joachim Fest. *Staatsstreich. Der lange Weg zum 20. Juli*, Berlin 1994. Taschenbuchausgabe 1997. English edition *Plotting Hitler's Death. The Story of the German Resistance*, New York 1996. The English edition has been used here. Ines Reich, *Carl Friedrich Goerdeler. Ein Oberbürgermeister gegen den NS-Staat*, Cologne 1997. Erik Carlsson, *Sverige och tysk motståndsrörelse under andra världskriget (Sweden and German Resistance during Second World War)*, Lund 1998.
3. Dulles, page 142 et seq.
4. Gerhard Ritter to Jacob Wallenberg 16 February, 1951, 3 March, 1952. Jacob Wallenberg to Gerhard Ritter 5 April, 1952.
5. Gerhard Ritter to Jacob Wallenberg 16 April, 1952, 23 July, 1952, 17 September, 1952, 12 October, 1953. Ritter page 334 et seq.
6. Ritter, page 320, note 2. Page 333, note 18, page 334, note 30, page 337, note 23, page 338, note 24, page 429, note 40.
7. Gunnar Hägglöf, *Svensk krigshandelspolitik under andra världskriget (Sweden's war trade policy during WW II)*, Stockholm 1958, page 97, page 109 et seq.
8. Hägglöf, page 92 et seq.
9. Minister for Foreign Affairs to Marcus Wallenberg 9 December, 1939. Ministry for Foreign Affairs to Marcus Wallenberg 15 December, 1939.
10. Biographical information concerning Goerdeler taken from Ritter, pages 31-87. A more detailed and complete picture of Goerdeler, particularly as regards his deliberations and actions before he decided to resign, is found in the dissertation by Ines Reich. Reich, pages 257-267.
11. Ritter, pages 157-169.
12. Ritter, pages 411-445.

13. The description of the Bosch deal is based upon Ulf Olsson's book, *Bank, familj och företagande. Stockholms Enskilda Bank 1946-1971 (Bank, Family and Enterprise. Stockholms Enskilda Bank 1946-1971)*, Stockholm 1986, pages 19-52. Ulf Olsson *Stockholms Enskilda Bank and the Bosch Group, 1939-1950*, Stockholm 1998, pages 11-49. No similar transaction has been described in such detail as the Bosch deal. The description is based upon material not only from Stockholms Enskilda Bank but also from Robert Bosch GmbH, Stuttgart, Sullivan & Cromwell, New York and from authorities both in Sweden and the U.S.A.

14. Olsson 1986, page 34. Olsson 1998, page 28.

15. Olsson 1986, page 50-51. Olsson 1998, page 47.

16. Anthony Cave Brown, *Bodyguard of Lies*. London 1979, page 239.

17. Klemens von Klemperer, *German Resistance against Hitler. The Search for Allies Abroad 1938-1945*. Oxford 1992, pages 343-350, 410, note 211.

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During World War II, the German Resistance leader Carl Goerdeler got into contact with Jacob Wallenberg. He would use this contact as well as Jacob Wallenberg's brother, Marcus Wallenberg, in order to approach the British Government for the purpose of exploring the prospects of negotiating a separate peace agreement with the Allies after Hitler had been overthrown and a new regime had been installed in Germany.

As early as about a year after the war, this became widely known. However, complete documents illustrating this course of events have been missing until now. Recently, several unknown documents were discovered that are reproduced here in full, including two personal and moving letters that Carl Goerdeler wrote from prison in 1944.

Gert Nylander, Ph.D., former archivist of Stockholms Enskilda Bank, is currently active within the Foundation.

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